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A LAWYER’S HIDDEN PERSUADER:  
GENRE BIAS AND HOW IT SHAPES LEGAL 
TEXTS BY CONSTRAINING WRITERS’ 





Shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, 
indivisible from their instruments and encasements.1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION   
 
Instruments of knowledge are what we call “texts,” and the 
encasements for those texts are what are called “genres.” Genres 
                                                          
Author’s Note:  A shorter version of this article was presented at The Impact of 
Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and Writing Strategies Conference, hosted by 
Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York, on March 1, 2013.  
* Mr. Rappaport is a practicing attorney, an Adjunct Professor at Dominican 
University, River Forest, Illinois, where he teaches composition, and seminars 
on philosophy and sociology, and a former Legal Writing Instructor at DePaul 
University College of Law. Mr. Rappaport holds an M.A. in Writing & Rhetoric 
from DePaul University. I would like to thank the Honorable Richard Posner for 
his pointed (and helpful) criticism of an earlier draft of this article. Additionally, 
I want to thank University of Missouri St. Louis Professor Joseph Carroll for 
assistance with this article and for inspiring my overall scholarly efforts to link 
evolution and cognitive psychology to legal writing. I also thank Professor 
Michael Sinding of Amsterdam University and Professor Vijay K. Bhatia of 
City University of Hong Kong for their suggestions, as well as my colleagues 
Bethany Schols and Ellen McManus for their edits. And to Jina, thank you for 
your never-ending encouragement of my scholarship over all these decades.     
1 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 4 (1983); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Blurred 
Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER 
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19 (1983) (exploring the effect of 
genres in the humanities on sociological understanding). 
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are a cognitive process of classification that channel thinking and 
thereby influence individuals’ communicative actions.2 Genres are 
also central to human communication, understanding, and 
persuasion.3 It is “impossible to . . . dwell in the social world 
without repertoires of typified social responses in recurrent 
situations”4 and therefore, we rely on genres to shape our writing 
and speech and to make each of them “a recognizable response to 
the exigencies of the situation.”5 In this way, genre is “a situated 
form of cognition”6—and thus a powerful bias.7   
What this article titles “genre bias” is a cognitive short cut that 
allows us to more quickly process and better understand text. 
While such biases can affect our approach and interpretation of a 
text; the genre bias can also reinforce our sense of self by fulfilling 
expectations. In many ways, this is one reason why we find fiction 
compelling, news informative, and jokes funny.  
A simple test demonstrates the power of the genre bias—
genre’s power to skew one’s approach to and interpretation of a 
text (a bias). Assume the following paragraph comes from a novel 
entitled Murder at Marplethorpe:  
The clock on the mantelpiece said ten thirty, but 
                                                          
2 See Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres of Organizational 
Communication: A Structural Approach to Studying Communication and Media, 
17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 299, 300–02 (1992); see also Michael Sinding, After 
Definitions: Genre, Categories, and Cognitive Science, 35 GENRE 181, 193 
(2002) [hereinafter Sinding, After Definitions] (“Genre knowledge is not 
specialist understanding, but rather functional or interactive capacity . . . to 
recognize new as well as existing members of the genre by their own features, to 
understand conventions and how to respond to them.”).  
3 See Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2, at 181–82, 213–14. 
4 The terms “recurrent” situation and “recurring” situation are used 
interchangeably in this article.   
5 Carol Berkenkotter & Thomas N. Huckin, Rethinking Genre from a 
Sociocognitive Perspective, 10 WRITTEN COMM. 475, 482 (1993) [hereinafter 
Berkenkotter & Huckin, Rethinking Genre].   
6 ANNA TROSBORG, ANALYSING PROFESSIONAL GENRES viii (2000); see 
also CAROL BERKENKOTTER & THOMAS N. HUCKIN, GENRE KNOWLEDGE IN 
DISCIPLINARY COMMUNICATION: COGNITION/CULTURE/POWER 3 (1995) 
(asserting that genre knowledge is “a form of situated cognition”). 
7 William J. Clancy, Situated Action: A Neuropsychological Interpretation 
Response to Vera and Simon, 17 COGNITIVE SCI. 87, 95 (1983). 
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someone had suggested recently that the clock was 
wrong. As the figure of the dead woman lay on the 
bed in the front room, a no less silent figure glided 
rapidly from the house. The only sounds to be heard 
were the ticking of that clock and the loud wailing 
of an infant.8 
Now read it again, and assume the title is The Personal History 
of David Marplethorpe.9 The difference is palpable.   
In this famous example of the power of genre to channel the 
reader’s understanding of a text, English professor Heather 
Dubrow asks readers to consider how the meaning of the text 
changes based on the assigned genre.10 As a piece of detective 
fiction, “the inaccuracy of the clock and the fact that the woman 
lies dead in the front room become important clues [and] the figure 
gliding away assumes a particular subject role within the discourse, 
the subject role of suspect.”11 As a coming-of-age autobiography, 
the reader places a “different significance on the dead body or the 
fact that the clock is inaccurate.”12 Certainly, in such a novel we 
will be less likely to look for a suspect. That is, we will not be 
reading with “detective eyes” as we would if we were reading 
detective fiction. As Dubrow suggests, in a coming-of-age 
autobiography the crying baby will become more central to the 
meaning and even become the very David Marplethorpe whose 
story is being told.13   
While literature is often thought of as synonymous with genre 
generally, you would be hard pressed find a profession more 
immersed in this normative force of genre bias than the field of 
                                                          
8 HEATHER DUBROW, GENRE 1 (1982). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 3. This can go on and on with alternative titles as college English 
teachers seek to help their students understand genre.  For example, what if the 
title were “The Vampire of Marplethorpe” or “Marplethorpe Home Security?”  
See Melanie Kill, Thinking About Genre, UNIV. OF WASH. (2007),  
available at http://courses.washington.edu/webrhet/bis384/documents/ 
thinkingaboutgenre.pdf. 
11 Anis Bawarshi, The Genre Function, 62 C. ENG. 335, 342 (2000). 
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
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law.14 Thus it would seem natural that a complete understanding of 
legal writing—including how and why it works—is achieved only 
with an appreciation of genre bias, a new phrase for an innate 
phenomenon. Genre bias, as a central part of genre, must be 
appreciated by lawyers and judges because “understanding the 
genres of written communication in one’s field is . . . essential to 
professional success.”15 Yet, remarkably, genre bias remains 
largely unexplored by legal writing instructors and entirely 
unappreciated by practicing lawyers. This Article aims to change 
that. 
Practitioners of the law are varied. They include leasing 
lawyers, transactional lawyers, patent lawyers, criminal lawyers, 
appellate lawyers, trial lawyers, immigration lawyers, 
environmental lawyers, law professors, criminal judges, divorce 
judges, and so on. Each practitioner thinks like a lawyer,16 and 
                                                          
14 See Karen Petroski, Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, 
Jurisdiction, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 252 (2012) (“Legal theory and doctrine 
have long explored the normative force of particular instances of 
communication, as well as particular instances of categorization. Many (though 
not all) such questions are internalized in legal training and addressed in 
doctrine. The legally trained intuitively, if not explicitly, understand that 
particular instances of classification gain their normative force as a result of 
processes similar to those described by genre theorists. Some individuals and 
institutions—such as legislators, law revision committees, legal publishers, 
judges, and treatise authors—are accorded authority, by social practice and other 
institutional mechanisms, to make classifications that others will treat as having 
normative force.”) (citation omitted). 
15 TROSBORG, supra note 6, at vii. 
16 ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO 
THINK LIKE A LAWYER (2007); see also Christoph A. Hafner, A Multi-
Perspective Genre Analysis of the Barrister’s Opinion: Writing Context, 
Generic Structure, and Textualization, 27 WRITTEN COMM. 411, 413 (2010) 
(“Legal reasoning, frequently referred to as ‘thinking like a lawyer’ can be 
conceived of as a form of rule-based reasoning, in which abstract principles of 
law are applied to given factual situations, in order to determine the rights and 
duties of the parties to a dispute.”). Some call this idea of “thinking like a 
lawyer” a broad type of genre—a meta-genre. See Vijay K. Bhatia, Legal 
Genres, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGES & LINGUISTICS 1, 1–2 (Keith 
Brown et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Bhatia, Legal Genres]; see also Janet 
Giltrow, Meta-Genre, in THE RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY OF GENRE: STRATEGIES 
FOR STABILITY AND CHANGE 187, 195 (Richard M. Coe et al. eds., 2002) 
(“[M]eta-genres are the atmospheres of wordings and activities, demonstrated 
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while this mindset guides how lawyers view problems and facts, 
each practice area has its own generic code17 which functions as a 
kind of doorway permitting entry to a room that only those who 
know and use the code can meaningfully access. These genres, as 
well as the broader notion of thinking like a lawyer, function both 
collectively and independently to guide and constrain the texts that 
lawyers and judges use in specific circumstances18 and become 
engrained in the practitioner’s mind.19   
We humans are homo categorius.  Our brains categorize things, 
events, books, memories, socks, stocks, rocks, people, photos, and 
just about everything we do, or are, or interact with.20 While not 
                                                          
precedents or sequestered expectations—atmospheres surrounding genres.”). 
17 See, e.g., VIJAY K. BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE USE IN 
PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS (1993) [hereinafter BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE]; 
JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2003); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 
(2004); PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (2000); ENRIQUE ALCARAZ VARÓ & 
BRIAN HUGHES, LEGAL TRANSLATION EXPLAINED (2002); Brenda Danet, Legal 
Discourse, in HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 270 (Teun A. Van Dijk ed., 
1985) [hereinafter Danet, Legal Discourse]; Brenda Danet, Language in the 
Legal Process, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 445 (1980) [hereinafter Danet, Language]. 
18 Law library and law bookstore shelves are filled with legal writing text 
books, how-to books and handbooks, all providing formats for memorandum, 
briefs, pleadings, letters and the like. While these books offer a guide on how to 
write as a lawyer, they do not delve into or even hint at the cognitive molding of 
genre bias. Collectively and individually, these books do confirm the existence 
of and need to adhere to the forms and norms of legal writing—the subgenres 
that are practice area and document type. See, e.g., KENNETH A. ADAMS, LEGAL 
USAGE IN DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS (2001); LINDA H. EDWARDS, 
LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2011); ELIZABETH FAJANS ET. AL., 
WRITING FOR LAW PRACTICE: ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING (2d ed. 2010); JOYCE 
J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2007); LAUREL 
CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, 
RESEARCH AND WRITING (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter LEGAL WRITING 
HANDBOOK]; EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND APPELLATE 
ARGUMENT (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter BRIEF WRITING AND APPELLATE 
ARGUMENT]; JANE N. RICHMOND, LEGAL WRITING: FORM AND FUNCTION 
(2002); MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND 
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (3d ed. 2012); JOHN SWALES, GENRE 
ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS (1980). 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 For more information on how humans categorize objects in terms of 
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every object, every event, every memory, every person, or every 
sock, stock, rock, picture, and book fits neatly into a specific 
category, and even though there are often overlaps and gaps, and 
misfits, we still cognitively categorize everything. This 
categorization includes texts—literary, legal, or otherwise. This 
categorization is a cognitive bias, and understanding this bias has 
everything to do with being a more effective and persuasive legal 
writer.   
Genre is central to meaning-making21 and channeling thinking, 
as either (or both) a generator for, or consequence of, the human 
cognitive bias to categorize. Therefore, genre influences decision-
making. Categories of legal writing have been studied, but the 
study of genre as a cognitive bias in legal writing is uncharted 
water. Genre bias in lawyerly texts (legal writing) is real and it 
needs to be explored and appreciated. This Article seeks to do the 
former; lawyers need to do the latter.  
In this Article, Part II provides an overview of genre studies in 
literature, which is the traditional home of such scholarship. After 
exploring genre studies, mostly from the humanities, Part III of this 
Article discusses the science of cognitive biases and the unicorn 
that is the “rational” decision-maker. The discussion of these areas 
of study uncovers a gap in need of a bridge. In Part IV, this Article 
                                                          
common attributes, such as physical features and function, see John R. 
Anderson, The Adaptive Nature of Human Categorization, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 
409 (1991). 
21 “Meaning making”, a concept in the humanities,  
draws on multiple traditions in sociology, anthropology, and 
other social sciences. At its root is the proposition that humans 
constantly seek to understand the world around them, and that 
the imposition of meaning on the world is a goal in itself, a 
spur to action, and a site of contestation. Meaning includes 
moral understandings of right and wrong, cognitive 
understandings of true and false, perceptual understandings of 
like and unlike, social understandings of identity and 
difference, aesthetic understandings of attractive and 
repulsive, and any other understandings that we may choose to 
identify through our own academic processes of meaning-
making. 
Charles Kurzman, Introduction Meaning-Making in Social Movements, 81 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 5, 5 (2008). 
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builds that bridge by proposing that, in light of corresponding 
scholarship in the humanities, neuroscience, and social science, 
genre be considered a kind of cognitive bias.  
Finally, with the bridge linking these areas of scholarship 
firmly in place, in Part V, this Article crosses the newly laid planks 
to apply genre bias to legal writing. This is done through a survey 
approach, with a brief foray into the legal sub-genres of wills and 
appellate briefs to highlight the importance of writing legal 
documents to conform to the genre. This section includes 
recommendations that practicing lawyers should almost never 
break the established genre in litigation documents unless no other 
good tactical choice remains and practicing lawyers should never 
break transactional documents genres—ever. Part VI concludes 
with an appeal to build on the genre analysis of legal writing 
undertaken in this Article and by law professors Michael Smith 
and Karen Sneddon along with humanities professors Vijay K. 
Bhatia and Michael Sinding, among others.  
In the end, lawyers who cross that bridge and understand legal 
writing as, at least partially, a function of genre bias will better 
comprehend how legal texts are conceived, received, and 
perceived, and will be better lawyers as a consequence. The 
practical applications of this understanding are legion. Lawyers 
who conform their documents and pleadings to the correct genre 
will take advantage of that reader’s genre bias. In this way, they 
will have a cognitive head start as the reader is already prepped to 
receive the substance of the text and is satisfied by recognizing 
what he expected. 
By contrast, lawyers who eschew the appropriate genre create a 
cognitive hurdle that, in almost every case, runs counter to the 
client’s best interests. To be sure, breaking the genre may cause the 
reader to pause and take notice, but that is not the same thing as 
achieving the result desired (and paid for) by the client.   
Admittedly, judges and legal scholars are removed from those 
same strictures of genre compliance because they do not serve 
clients. Therefore, these legal writers are prone to occasionally 
break the genre of opinions or law review articles. Still, judges and 
legal scholars have an audience—an audience with expectations 
precast by genre. Victor Hugo aptly wrote that “life is a theatre set 
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in which there are but few practicable entrances.”22 Legal writing, 
all legal writing, is also a theater set, with performers, a script, and 
an audience. For the theater of legal writing, genre is not only the 
most practical entrance, but the essential one. 
 
II.  LITERATURE ON GENRE STUDY 
 
Traditionally, scholars viewed genre as a class of texts 
“distinguished according to mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
characteristics.”23  In this way, genre is “a category of composition 
in music or literature, marked by a distinctive style, form, or 
content.”24 Sometimes called a “folk conception of genre,”25 this 
oldest line of genre study dating back to Aristotle analyzes literary 
forms, such as poetry, prose, and plays.26  More recently, genre has 
been pegged as a generative force vitally connected to social 
action.27 This current description of genre expands the ancient 
genre paradigm so genres today are most often defined as “ways of 
recognizing, responding to, acting meaningfully within, and 
                                                          
22 Chapter IV: The Back Room of Café Musain, VICTOR  
HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES, http://www.cartage.org.lb/en/themes/BookLibrary/ 
books/bibliographie/H/Hugovictor/LesMiserables/VolumeIII-Marius/book4/ 
ch4.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
23 George Kamberelis, Genre as Institutionally Informed Social Practice, 6 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 118 (1995). 
24 Judy M. Cornett, The Ethics of Blawging: A Genre Analysis, 41 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 221, 225–26 (2009) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757 (3d ed. 1992)); see also Anthony Chase, Toward a 
Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527, 564. 
25 Petroski, supra note 14, at 246. 
26 Cornett, supra note 24, at 226. 
27 Social actions are the responses to “understanding how to participate in 
the actions of a community.”  Carolyn R. Miller, Genre as Social Action, 70 Q.J. 
SPEECH 151, 165 (1984). See also ANIS S. BAWARSHI & MARY JO REIFF, GENRE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PEDAGOGY 3–5 
(2010); ALASTAIR FOWLER, KINDS OF LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
THEORY OF GENRES AND MODES (1982). In addition to the rhetorical and 
categorical genre paradigms, there are three other means of studying genre: 
genre in language studies, genre in systemic-functional linguistics and genre in 
applied linguistics. See John Corbett, Genre and Genre Analysis, in 5 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS 26, 26–29 (Keith Brown et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
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helping to reproduce recurrent situations.”28 Known more 
particularly as rhetorical situations,29 these recurrent situations are 
ones in which a speaker or writer can effect change. A simple 
example of a rhetorical situation can be found at a school board 
meeting where eliminating the art or gifted programs is being 
discussed and decided.  A parent, who is there speaking against the 
cuts, finds herself in a rhetorical situation. Nearly everything a 
lawyer does in his or her professional role takes place in a 
rhetorical situation.   
An influential work viewing genre this way is English 
professor Carolyn R. Miller’s 1984 article, Genre as Social 
Action.30 Miller points out that “situations are social constructs that 
are the result, not of perception, but of “definition.”31 She explains 
that this is so “because human action is based on and guided by 
meaning, not by material causes. At the center of this action is the 
                                                          
28 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 3. 
29 According to Lloyd Bitzer, a rhetorical situation has three elements:  
(1) Exigence: “An imperfection marked by urgency; it is a 
defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing 
which is other than it should be.” There are many different 
kinds of exigencies, but a rhetorical one exists when discourse 
can modify it positively;    
(2) Audience: an “audience consists only of those persons who 
are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being 
mediators of change”; and  
(3) Constraints “made up of persons, events, objects and 
relations which are parts of the situation because they have the 
power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the 
exigence.”  
Lloyd F. Blitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1–14 
(1968). Bazerman defines “rhetorical situations” as consisting of “all 
the contextual factors shaping a moment in which a person feels called 
upon to make symbolic statement.” CHARLES BAZERMAN, SHAPING 
WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE: THE GENRE AND ACTIVITY OF THE 
EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN SCIENCE 8 n.10 (1988); see also Jason K. 
Cohen, Attorneys at the Podium: A Plain-Language Approach to Using 
the Rhetorical Situation in Public Speaking Outside the Courtroom, 8 J. 
ALWD 73, 75–80 (2011). 
30 See Miller, supra note 27. 
31 Id. at 156. 
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process of interpretation.”32  This is where genre, as a recurrent 
significant action “based in recurrent situations,”33 comes into 
play34 because genres and rhetorical situations are reciprocal.35 To 
illustrate this point, English professor Amy J. Devitt of the 
University of Kansas cites the example of a grocery list. A list is 
considered a mundane grocery list because that simple document 
lists groceries and is used for the purpose of creating the recurrent 
situation of purchasing groceries by use of a list.36 Indeed, every 
text produced within a genre “reinforces or remolds some aspect of 
the genre.”37 Professor Kirsten K. Davis of Stetson University 
College of Law notes that legal forms are like grocery lists in that 
they “serve as an idealization of past legal experience . . . . [that] 
formulates future experience,”38 but she avoids the term “genre.”  
In one of the few law review articles that addresses genre, 
literary professor George Kamberelis summarizes six 
characteristics of genres, and genre bias can be inferred from the 
final one on this list.39 Kamberelis writes that “for speakers and 
writers, hearers and readers, genres function as [cognitive] 
suppositional and metaphoric starting points for rhetorical and 
interpretative action within . . . [professional] fields.”40 As 
                                                          
32 Id. at 159, 165. 
33 Id. at 159.  
34 See ANNE HERRINGTON & CHARLES MORAN, GENRE ACROSS THE 
CURRICULUM 12 (2005). 
35 See Katherine Hall Jamieson, Antecedent Genres as Rhetorical 
Constraints, 61 Q.J. SPEECH 406 (1975) (arguing that antecedent genres and 
recurrent situations can have a reciprocal relationship in eliciting rhetorical 
responses). 
36 See AMY J. DEVITT, WRITING GENRES 23–24 (2004). 
37 BAZERMAN, supra note 29, at 8. 
38  Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms As Rhetorical Transaction: Competency 
in the Context of Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667, 689 
(2011). 
39 Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 121. 
40 Id. The other five characteristics of genre are (1) genres, texts, and social 
practices can be understood only when considered together; (2) within a 
particular professional field, genres develop dynamically as durable forms of 
communication are in relation to recurrent rhetorical situations; (3) rather than 
simple, genres are “complex configurations of formal features” and thematic 
content; (4) Genres originate from and belong to fairly specific professional 
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discussed more fully below in the section on why not to break a 
genre,41 Kamberelis cites the work of Adena Rosmarin, who 
argues that genres function as “premises for arguments and 
metaphors for thinking that allow people to begin, but not to 
complete, acts of text production and interpretation.”42   
In this way, legal writers—like poets, reporters, or novelists— 
“view the world from generic perches.”43 It is from atop this perch 
that the three cognitive stages of genre bias operate: pre-reading, 
while-reading, and post-reading.44 In the pre-reading stage, the 
reader forms the purpose for the applicable text and retrieves the 
schema.45 The while-reading stage is the most cognitively 
complex.46 In this stage, the reader engages in the text-perception 
process, which involves recognizing the conventional formal 
features of the genre and understanding the discourse semantics.47 
In the post-reading stage, the reader who has just finished reading 
the text now firmly assigns the genre and enriches the text with 
schemata48 stored within his or her memory.49   
                                                          
fields; (5) Genres are acquired, “learned and used as a function of situated  
practice” within certain settings and within specific professional fields. Id. at 
120–21. 
41 See infra Part V.C.3.a. 
42 Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 156. 
43 Id. at 155. 
44 See Huijun Chen, A Cognitive Model for Recognition of Genre, 5 ASIAN 
SOC. SCI. 25, 28 (2009). This process parallels the process of the writer. See also 
Erika Abner & Shelley Kierstead, A Preliminary Exploration of the Elements of 
Expert Performance in Legal Writing, 16 LEGAL WRITING 363, 369–70 (2010). 
There are three basic text production processes of “planning [or] generating 
concepts and setting goals to be achieved within the text; translating ideas into 
text; and reviewing ideas and text [and] detecting faults at multiple levels.” Id. 
(citation omitted). 
45 Chen, supra note 44, at 28. In the process of reading, “the environment 
sets up powerful expectations: we are already prepared for certain genres but not 
for others before we open a newspaper, a scholarly journal or the box containing 
some machine we have just bought.” SWALES, supra note 18, at 88. 
46 Chen, supra note 44, at 28. 
47 Id. 
48 Schema (singular schemata) are mental structures for representing 
generic concepts stored in memory. See generally DAVID EVERETT RUMELHART, 
SCHEMATA: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF COGNITION 38–58 (1980). 
49 Chen, supra note 44, at 28. See infra Part IV for more discussion of 
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Each of the above stages is essential in the persuasion process.  
A “thread” through the entire cognitive process is the prior 
knowledge of the genre characteristics and how genre functions 
within the mind of both the writer and the reader.50  It is through 
this cognitive process that genres become “scheme-text-practice 
configurations that fuse form, content, and ideology”51 in rhetorical 
situations for specific communities of practice.  Accordingly, 
genres operate as a cognitive bias.  
 
III. LITERATURE ON COGNITIVE BIAS 
 
It is more reassuring to us to undergo a medical procedure with 
a ninety percent chance of success, compared with the same 
treatment that holds a ten percent mortality rate.52  If asked, “How 
old is Brad Pitt?” and then asked, “How old is Joe Biden?,” we 
estimate the Vice President’s age to be higher than if first asked, 
“How old is Joe Biden?,” and then asked, “How old is Brad 
Pitt?”53 Losing $100 upsets more than finding $100 pleases.54  
While the causes of these phenomena are complex and 
multifactorial, “they are in part attributable to the fact that 
cognition is plagued by blind spots, preconceived assumptions, 
emotional influences, and built-in biases.”55 These biases are 
hardwired into our neural circuitry.56   
In 1974, psychology professors Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman wrote, in their landmark article, that humans have a 
                                                          
schemata. 
50 Chen, supra note 44, at 29.  
51 Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 154.   
52 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 88 (2011). 
53 See DEAN BUONOMANO, BRAIN BUGS: HOW THE BRAIN’S FLAWS SHAPE 
OUR LIVES 150–51 (2011). In an informal experiment, when asked to estimate 
actor Brad Pitt’s age before Vice President Joseph Biden’s, participants on 
average estimated Pitt to be 42.9 years old and Biden to be 61.1 years old.  
When asked Biden’s age before Pitt’s, participants on average estimated Pitt to 
be 44.2 years old and Biden to be 64.7 years old.  At the time, Brad Pitt was 45 
years old, and Vice President Biden was 66 years old.  Id. at 151. 
54 Id. at 153.   
55 Id. at 144. 
56 Id. at 160–70. 
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“heuristics and biases” approach to information processing.57  
Predictions and judgments that we make intuitively are facilitated 
by a small number of separate mental operations. Heuristic 
examples58 include insensitivity to an outcome’s prior probability 
of outcome, over-confidence in subjective probability distribution, 
and false correlation.59 These heuristics are essential to information 
processing, and, while they do have the advantage of increasing 
cognitive speed and efficiency, these processes can also lead to 
errors or biases when measured against reality.60 Thus, a cognitive 
bias61 is “a replicable pattern in perceptual distortion, inaccurate 
judgment, and illogical interpretation,”62 or put simply, a 
                                                          
57 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–31 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky 
& Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases]. Heuristics, in simplest terms, are patterns 
of thinking. The brain constructs mental shortcuts, algorithms, to process 
information in an efficient manner. Over evolutionary time, these heuristics have 
proven advantageous allowing human to navigate a complex cognitive world 
quickly, and most of the time, to their evolutionary advantage. Cognitive biases 
are heuristics gone awry because the environmental circumstances in which that 
heuristic evolved has changed. See id. Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Economics for his pioneering work, along with Amos Tversky, in 
founding the discipline of behavioral economics which is based on cognitive 
biases in decision-making. For more information, see generally KAHNEMAN, 
supra note 52; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter 
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability 
Judgment, 91 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, 
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning]. 
58 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive 
Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582 (1996) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, 
Cognitive Illusions]. 
59 See Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 57, at 
1124–26, 1128. 
60 See id. at 1131. 
61 Tversky & Kahneman use the terms “behavioral economics” or 
“judgment and decision making (JDM)” to describe what more recent scholars 
call “cognitive bias.” 
62 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A 
Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430–54 (1972) 
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability]; see also DAN 
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
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systematic non-random error in thinking. For instance, people 
remember occupations better than names.63 We recall that the man 
on the plane is a baker, but we might forget that another man was 
named “Baker.”64   
A striking example of cognitive bias—because it operates even 
if you are looking for it—is the brain’s misread of parallel images 
in what is called the Leaning Tower Illusion.65 This is a 
phenomenon where an image of the famous tower viewed from 
below appears lopsided when placed next to a copy of itself.66   
 
Brains presume that parallel lines, like railroad tracks, 
                                                          
DECISIONS (rev. ed. 2010) (recurrent irrationality in judgment and decision 
making); JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (4th ed. 2007) 
(rationality in judgment and decision making).  
63 See Katherine H. McWeeny et al., Putting Names To Faces, 78 BRIT. J. 
OF PSYCHOL. 143–49 (1987). 
64 See id. at 146 (finding that participants in a study “recalled an occupation 
without a name more often than s/he recalled a name without an occupation”); 
see also BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 4; Deborah M. Burke et.al, On The Tip 
Of The Tongue: What Causes Word Finding Failures In Young And Older 
Adults?, 350 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 542–579 (1991) (concluding that proper 
names are more difficult to learn and recall).  
65 Frederick A. A. Kingdom et al., The Leaning Tower Illusion: A New 
Illusion of Perspective, 36 PERCEPTION 475, 475–77 (2007). 
66 Id. 
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converge in the distance at a place called the vanishing point.67 
When we look up at these parallel lines in the photo, they do not 
converge,68 but stop at the sky. Our brains, programmed to see 
parallel lines as converging, therefore interpret these lines as not 
parallel when they in fact are.69 The lines are the same, but our 
brains irrationally say that they are not.70 Despite this stark 
evidence, we strongly cling to the myth of the purely rational 
mind, including the mind of a decision-maker.   
The traditional model of the decision-maker is that of a 
mythical “rational” person, who applies an objective analysis 
reason to a set of objective facts from which he or she deduces the 
correct decision.71 While the falsity of this model is acknowledged 
and studied widely in other disciplines,72 lawyers refuse to concede 
that they are not entirely rational beings and are reluctant to even 
acknowledge the issue.73 Yet some within the legal community 
question the myth, if ever so slightly. For example, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon recently 
conceded that “researchers have convincingly demonstrated that in 
many instances people do not act as the robotic preference 
maximizers the law often assumes them to be.”74 She concludes 
that “it is not that humans are entirely irrational, but rather that our 
rationality is bounded.”75 By and large, however, lawyers continue 
                                                          
67 See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 144; see also James Galloway, 
Perspectives on Mathematics in Art History, 16 MATH HORIZONS 16 (2008). 
68 BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 144. 
69 See Kingdom et al., supra note 65, at 475. 
70 Id. 
71 Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. 
ECON. 99, 99 (1955) [hereinafter Simon, Rational Choice]; see also ARIELY, 
supra note 62; BARON, supra note 62. 
72 See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 62.  
73 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777 (2001) (exploring cognitive bias in judicial decision making); Ian 
Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal 
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783–834 (2003) (asserting that lawyers 
must recognize cognitive bias in their clients and themselves to counsel 
effectively). 
74 Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (2012). 
75 Id. (citation omitted). 
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to ride that mythic unicorn that is the purely rational man.76 
Science shows that the unicorn does not exist and lawyers need to 
recognize that reality.   
The cognitive science behind the understanding of behavior is 
necessary to the study of law because “[l]aws are made by 
humans.”77 Professor Kathryn M. Stanchi of Temple University 
James E. Beasley School of Law and other scholars recognize that 
understanding cognitive processes is important to all lawyers and, 
specifically, legal writers. Stanchi declares that “the art of 
persuasion requires empathy as well as a deep understanding of 
human psychology and the complex emotional and intellectual 
processes that result in perception and attitude change.”78 She is 
right. To do their job, lawyers need to understand how people think 
both rationally and irrationally, and how people change their 
minds both predictably and unpredictably.79   
While lawyers are beginning to take note, this contemporary 
discussion of cognitive bias and the law was foreshadowed eighty 
years ago by Judge Jerome Frank, who introduced the idea of 
sociological jurisprudence,80 now called Behavioral Decision 
Theory.81 Recently, there has been a move to augment the law-and-
                                                          
76 See Deborah J. Merritt, Legal Education in the Age of Cognitive Science 
and Advance Classroom Technology, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 39, 41 (2008) 
(“Despite significant advances in the science of learning, law professors today 
teach much as their own professors did a generation ago. Legal scholars and 
lawyers know surprisingly little about the cognitive science research that has 
unveiled new methods of harnessing the brain to work harder and smarter. The 
legal profession depends upon rigorous thinking, creative problem solving, and 
persuasive advocacy for success. Yet, law faculties have remained strangely 
oblivious to research about how the brain works.”).    
77 Terrance Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 35, 35 (2005). 
78 Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 412.   
79 Even Judge Marsha Berzon recognizes “[b]ecause our cognitive 
resources are limited, we often use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to solve 
complex problems. These shortcuts, while useful in allowing us efficiently to 
approximate solutions to difficult problems, sometimes result in errors. 
Importantly, these flaws are not random. Rather, humans err in consistent, 
predictable ways.” Berzon, supra note 74, at 1481–82. 
80 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
81 Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
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economics movement, embraced for the last thirty years,82 with a 
law-and-behavioral-science approach. This approach draws on 
cognitive science, sociology, and other behavioral sciences rather 
than relies on the rational decision maker.83 A host of 
psychological factors “influence individual judgment and choices,” 
including “beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and social forces, along 
with purely cognitive processes.”84 While lawyers and judges try to 
take account of, and discount for, these factors—at least the ones 
of which they are aware—the cognitive bias aspect of “Purely 
cognitive processes,”85 often escapes attention. 
The “invisible hand of cognitive bias”86 takes many forms and 
refers to making decisions in ways that systematically depart from 
rational choice.87 One example of cognitive biases studied is the 
                                                          
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 
1501 (1998). See also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinkski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to 
Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).  
82 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 
2010); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudwijn Bockaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 1999); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 10 (3d ed. 2003). 
83 See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (asserting that human behavior is 
better understood through behavioral and sociocultural theories than the rational 
choice theory). 
84 Langevoort, supra note 81, at 1503.   
85 Id. 
86 Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and 
Dress Codes, 41 U.S.F.L. REV. 299, 303 n.24 (2007). It is important to point out 
that although the existence of a systemic cognitive bias is a departure from pure 
rationality, as philosophers like Jon Elster and legal scholars Jules Coleman and 
Robert Scott have noted, “Identifying a departure from rationality is not the 
same as discovering irrationality.” Langevoort, supra note 81, at 1506; see also 
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 
(1985). Cognitive biases may be adaptive (beneficial) for most people most of 
the time. Just because cognitive biases may not be based in reason, it does not 
mean that they are necessarily bad. Bad or good, the point is that they need to be 
recognized for what they are and taken into account in advocating a client’s 
position as well as in administering justice. 
87 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 83, at 1076–1102 (exploring cognitive 
214 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
human genetic predisposition to react to and interact with stories.88  
Legal scholars point out that “[s]torytelling really is part of general 
lawyering skills, just as much as legal analysis, logic, and 
argumentation,”89 and it is important in every aspect of the practice 
of law.90 Legal scholars have also focused on another type of 
cognitive bias called “framing theory,” which posits that humans 
have a stronger disposition to avoid loss rather than attain gain.91  
This bias is why we are more likely to agree to undergo a medical 
                                                          
bias in common decision-making tasks, such as playing a game of chess or 
choosing health care insurance providers).  
88 See generally JOSEPH CARROLL, READING HUMAN NATURE: LITERARY 
DARWINISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2011); JONATHAN GOTTSCHALL, 
LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND A NEW HUMANITIES (2008). 
89 Legal Storytelling is an Innovative Approach to Law Education at 
Rutgers-Camden, RUTGERS TODAY (Aug. 18, 2011), http://news.rutgers.edu/ 
medrel/news-releases/2011/08/legal-storytelling-a-20110818. See also JAMES 
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW (1985); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for 
Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact 
Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459, 465 (2001); James Boyd White, What Can a 
Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2021 (1989) 
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD 
RELATION (1988)). 
90 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL 
WRITING 127 (2008); Bret A. Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins 
of Storytelling by Requiring Legal Writing Students to Read a Novel In Order to 
Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone (CSPTT) are as 
Important as IRAC, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 268 (2008); Donna M. Steslow & 
Carolyn Gardner, More than One Way to Tell a Story: Integrating Storytelling 
into Your Law Course, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 249 (2011). 
91 See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological 
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (2000) [hereinafter Guthrie, Framing 
Frivolous Litigation]; Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the 
Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1117–19 (2003) [hereinafter Guthrie, Prospect 
Theory]; see also Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 873 F.2d 465, 470 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(using framing theory to analyze jury’s finding of proximate cause). The 
adaptive basis for the aversion to loss is that we do not perish from passing up a 
positive choice, but a wrong step could spell doom. We are, therefore, pre-
disposed, biased, to avoid loss rather than seek gain. See generally Todd 
McElroy & John J. Seta, Framing the Frame: How Task Goals Determine the 
Likelihood and Direction of Framing Effects, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 
251 (2007); Kahneman & Tversky, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 57; 
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 57.  
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procedure with a ninety percent chance of success than the same 
procedure when it carries a ten percent mortality rate.92 Another 
bias called “temporal discounting” is the phenomenon in which we 
privilege the present and discount the future.93 In other words, we 
want things now.94 For example, most people choose $100 today in 
place of $120 a month from now.95 There is also hindsight bias—
when looking back, humans tend to overestimate the likelihood 
that they could have anticipated a future event.96 The “brain bug”97 
of hindsight bias has been explored by examining the manner by 
which bankruptcy judges go about finding fraudulent conveyances 
in the cases presented to them.98 With this background in mind, 
this Article now turns to genre bias, one of the many cognitive 
biases that operate within the legal writing context. 
 
IV. GENRE IS A COGNITIVE BIAS 
 
Cognitive biases, and by extension genre bias, are an innate 
part of human psychology.99 In our ancestral past, biases were 
mainly adaptive (i.e., advantageous to survival or reproduction).  
                                                          
92 KAHNEMAN, supra note 52, at 88. 
93 BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 100; Thomas S. Critchfield & Scott H. 
Kollins, Temporal Discounting: Basic Research and the Analysis of Socially 
Important Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 101, 102 (2001). 
94 See Bret A. Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an 
Effective Demand Letter, 5 J. ALWD 32, 40–41 (2008) (“People want things 
now, even when waiting for the payout will actually result in a greater benefit.”). 
95 BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 99–102. 
96 See Guthrie, Prospect Theory, supra note 91, at 1499, 1504; see also 
Jennifer Bonds-Raacke et al., Hindsight Bias Demonstrated in the Prediction of 
Sporting Event, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 349 (2001). 
97 Psychology professor Dean Buonomano of the University of California 
at Los Angeles refers to “brain bugs” as subtle biases, illusions, and irrationality 
that affect our decision-making abilities. See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 1–
3. 
98 Michael Simkovic & Benjamin Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout 
Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap 
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 151–55 (2010) (“Several studies set in 
a context resembling the circumstances of bankruptcy judges in fraudulent 
transfer cases against [leveraged buyout bankruptcy] lenders have found 
evidence of hindsight bias.”). 
99 See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 1–5. 
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While some biases remain adaptive,100 many biases are now 
maladaptive. This is due to the disconnection between our 
evolutionary environment and our modern world—legal101 and 
otherwise.102 Given what literary scholars say about genre and 
what researchers in the scientific community say about cognitive 
bias, genre should be considered a kind of cognitive bias.  
A comprehensive explanation of the claim that genre is an 
innate adaptive trait would be beyond this Article’s scope. In fact, 
the social science world is already fully engulfed in the broader 
endeavor of determining whether certain behaviors are the product 
of nature (adaptive) or the product of culture.103 Entire books have 
been devoted to the subject of whether behaviors like art and music 
are innate and adaptive traits.104 This Article, instead, focuses on 
exposing the logical existence of genre bias by exploring genre 
literature and through detailing the empirical evidence.  
First, however, it is important to understand how the human 
mind works and has evolved. The human mind is an “intricate, 
evolved machine that has allowed humans to inhabit”105 this 
complex, ever-changing world. In this complex world, humans 
must survive, thrive, and reproduce. The brain effectively solves a 
                                                          
100 See Robert A. Cummins & Helen Nistico, Maintaining Life Satisfaction: 
The Role of Positive Cognitive Bias, 3 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 37 (2002); Martie G. 
Haselton et al., Adaptive Rationality: An Evolutionary Perspective On Cognitive 
Bias, 27 SOC. COGNITION 732 (2009) (summarizing dozens of positive cognitive 
biases). 
101 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) (asserting that traditional overt discrimination has 
given way to subtle intergroup bias stemming from stereotypes and other 
cognitive distortions); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go 
Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 
9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 745–46 (2003). 
102 See, e.g., Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Models of Depression, 1 J. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY 5 (1987) (describing depression as a consequence 
of cognitive biases). 
103 See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN 
DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2003); EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE 
UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).  
104 See, e.g., DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY, PLEASURE, AND 
HUMAN EVOLUTION (2010). 
105 Haselton et al., supra note 100, at 733. 
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host of problems through “large-scale cooperation, social 
exchange, habitat formation, agriculture, and cumulative 
culture.”106 While Evolution is the ultimate determiner of our 
species’ physical characteristics107  many have questioned whether 
Evolution predisposes and guides behavior as well.108 The 
determination that a given behavior is or is not an adaptive product 
of biological evolution is not made under a microscope and 
behaviors do not fossilize. However, this that does not mean we 
cannot explore a variety of factors to determine if a given behavior 
is an aspect of universal human psychology, and therefore, a likely 
product of evolution. With greater frequency, scholars are 
highlighting an array of human behaviors—such as art,109 
storytelling,110 music,111 and even rhetoric112—that are likely 
                                                          
106 Id.   
107 Evolution, called descent with modification, is simply the species-based 
law of adapt and procreate—or perish. See generally Evolution 101, Descent 
with Modification, UNIV. OF CAL. – BERKELEY, http://evolution.berkeley.edu/ 
evosite/evo101/IIIADescent.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). Genetic drift and 
natural selection drive evolution. Genetic drift is the random alteration of 
inherited traits (in the form of gene alleles) from ancestor to descendent. Some 
mutations are positive, called adaptive, and some are negative, called 
maladaptive. Natural selection is the interaction of members of a population 
with their ecosystem such that those individuals with the traits better adapted to 
the environment will survive longer and have more reproductive success. These 
fertile adapters pass on those favored traits to their descendants. Those 
organisms not as well adapted to survive and procreate have fewer or no 
descendants. Over generations, those organisms possessing adaptive traits 
succeed. Those without such trait(s) fail. See generally DANIEL C. DENNET, 
DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 39–42 
(1996).  
108 See generally ALAS, POOR DARWIN: ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (Hilary Rose and Steven Rose eds., 2000). 
109 See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 104. 
110 See BRYAN BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES: EVOLUTION, COGNITION, 
AND FICTION (repr. 2010); JOSEPH CARROLL, LITERARY DARWINISM: 
EVOLUTION, HUMAN NATURE, AND LITERATURE (2004); JOSEPH CARROLL, 
READING HUMAN NATURE: LITERARY DARWINISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2011). 
111 See Steven Brown, The “Musilanguage” Model of Music Evolution, in 
THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 271, 296 (Nils L. Wallin et al. eds., 2001). See also 
Ellen Dissanayake, Antecedents of the Temporal Arts in Early Mother-Infant 
Interaction, in THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 389, 391–405 (Nils L. Wallin et al. eds., 
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adaptive, and genre should be added to that list. 
There are a number of key areas of inquiry for determining 
whether an aspect of behavior is adaptive. These include whether 
there is the cross-cultural presence of the trait, how far back in 
human history the trait can be found, and whether the trait 
bestowed some evolutionary advantage on early humans.113 Based 
on these factors, some have argued that art114 and stories115 are 
adaptive. But the most telling evidence that a behavior may well be 
the product of evolution is the fact that the trait is practiced 
everywhere—the so-called “human universals.”116   
Universals are “those (empirically determined) features of 
culture, society, language, and psyche found in all 
ethnographically or historically recorded human societies.”117 
Human universals are not features of anatomy like eyes, but rather 
are products of the mind.118 In a broader context view, “the human 
common sense view of the world” is a universal.119  Some of the 
hundreds of human universals120 include tools and tool-making, 
myths, legends, fear of snakes, proverbs, sex roles, music, kinship 
systems, grammar, marriage, personal names, and so on.  Since the 
traits are universal between different areas and cultures, “it is 
plausible that these traits have a biological basis and that they are 
                                                          
2001). 
112 See Bret A. Rappaport, Darwinian Ceremonies: Is the Rhetoric of 
Praise and Blame Adaptive?, 2 EVOLUTIONARY REV. 151 (2011). 
113 See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 104, at 84. 
114 See, e.g., id. 
115 See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 110. 
116 Donald E. Brown, Human Universals and Their Implications,  
in BEING HUMANS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY IN 
TRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 156, 156 (Neil Roughley ed., 2000). 
117 Id. at 156. 
118 Id. at 157.   
119 EDWARD G. SLINGERLAND, WHAT SCIENCE OFFERS THE HUMANITIES: 
INTEGRATING BODY AND CULTURE 139 (2008) (“It is the existence and 
interaction . . . that gives rise to the human ‘commonsense’ view of the world, 
which remains quite robustly universal despite the vagaries of cultural 
variation.”). 
120 Donald E. Brown provides a list of Human Universals in STEVEN 
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 434–39 (2002).  
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evolved features of a universal human nature.”121 Universals 
commonly arise because they are “good tricks”—forced solutions 
to recurring situations.122 Genres are such a “good trick,” and while 
[n]o one would defend the idea that there is a “hero-
slays-dragon-and-wins-hand-of-beautiful-maiden” 
gene in the human gene pool[,] . . . given that there 
is a nontrivial set of innate human desires and 
capacities, and the fact that the world in which 
humans operate has had a fairly stable structure for 
at least the past several millennia, it is not surprising 
that tales of evil stepmothers or brave underdog 
heroes will arise universally and have universal 
appeal.123 
Similarly, although there is no “genre” gene, any more than 
there is a “hero-slays-dragon-and-wins-hand-of-beautiful-maiden” 
gene, genre is a human universal. Genre is just like art, music, 
marriage, personal names, and the rest.124 Genre, as a functional 
way to categorize and think, transcends cultures and environments.  
Recognized for at least 2,500 years,125 genre bestows a host of 
advantages on humans. For example, genre allows humans to 
process information more quickly.126 A host of studies attest to the 
                                                          
121 Elizabeth Cashdan, What is a Human Universal? Human Behavioral 
Ecology and Human Nature, in ARGUING ABOUT HUMAN NATURE: 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 71, 71 (Stephen M. Downes & Edouard Machery 
eds., 2013). There remains some debate as to “true universals” versus 
“conditional universals.” Donald E. Brown, Human Universals, Human Nature, 
And Human Culture, 133 DAEDALUS 47–54 (2004). The former apply to all 
humans while the latter are selected for. Brown, who cites only to true 
universals, undervalues human innateness, argues Haidt. See JONATHAN HAIDT, 
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND 
RELIGION 130–32 (2013).   
122 HAIDT, supra note 121, at 139 (citing DENNET, supra note 107, at 486). 
123 SLINGERLAND, supra note 119, at 140–41. 
124 See Miller, supra note 27, at 161–62 (citing KENNETH BURKE, A 
GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 103–04 (1969)). 
125 Plato divided literature into three genres: poetry, drama, and prose. See 
GERARD GENNETTE, THE ARCHITEXT: AN INTRODUCTION 6 (Jane E. Lewin 
trans., 1992). 
126 See Gary M. Olson et al., Cognitive Aspects of Genre, 10 POETIC 283 
(1981). See also Karl F. Haberlandt & Arthur C. Graesser, Component 
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effect genre has on comprehension,127 recall, and memory.128 In 
fact, genre manifests itself in children as early as pre-school age,129 
and “[u]nderstanding the effect of genre on reading could lead to 
more efficient teaching strategies and interventions in schools.”130 
A recent study of medical students for whom English was a second 
language points in a similar direction.131 The researchers 
concluded that there may be pedagogical value in “sensitizing 
students to rhetorical effects and to rhetorical structure that recur in 
genre-specific texts, to activate and develop schemata, to have 
learners schematize and/or criticize different textual structures and 
provide prototypical examples of scientific rhetoric.”132 
In addition to the inferential evidence, neuroscience has studied 
                                                          
Processes in Text Comprehension and Some of Their Interactions, 114 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 357 (1985) (showing the relationship between 
categorization and the ability to process information); K.M. Zabrucky & D. 
Moore, Influence of Text Genre on Adults’ Monitoring of Understanding and 
Recall, 25 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 691 (1999) (discussing memory management 
processes in older adults). 
127 See, e.g., Olson et al., supra note 126; Charles A. Weaver & Deborah S. 
Bryant, Monitoring of Comprehension: The Role of Text Difficulty in 
Metamemory for Narrative and Expository Text, 23 MEMORY & COGNITION 12 
(1995). 
128 See Arthur C. Graesser et al., Advanced Outlines, Familiarity, and Text 
Genre on Retention of Prose, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 281 (reporting 
findings that narrative passages were better recalled than were expository 
passages); Michael B. W. Wolfe, Memory for Narrative and Expository Text: 
Independent Influences of Semantic Associations and Text Organization 31 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 359 (2005). 
129 Ruth A. Berman & Bracha Nir-Sagiv, Comparing Narrative and 
Expository Text Construction Across Adolescence: A Developmental Paradox, 
43 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 79, 104–05 (2007). 
130 Amy Kurivchack Landers, An Examination of Genre Differences 3 
(Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file 
with author). 
131 Francoise Salager-Meyer, Reading Expository Prose at the Post-
Secondary Level: The Influence of Textual Variable on L2 Reading 
Comprehension (A Genre-based Approach), 8 READING FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
645, 660 (1991) (citing Piedad Fernandez Toledo, Genre Analysis and Reading 
of English as a Foreign Language: Genre Schemata Beyond Text Typologies, 37 
J. PRAGMATICS 1059, 1069 (2005)). 
132 Toledo, supra note 131, at 1069 (quoting Salager-Meyer, supra note 
131, at 660). 
 A LAWYER’S HIDDEN PERSUADER 221 
how genre actually functions in the brain,133 further indicating the 
existence of genre bias. In a series of articles on what he calls 
“cognitive category theory,” and what this Article calls “genre 
bias,” Professor Michael Sinding summarizes the landscape.134 The 
classic view of cognition is that concepts are first mentally 
processed definitions, where each object is either included in or 
excluded from a category, and between members of a category 
there are no distinctions.135 This is the essence of the ancient view 
of genre, and it is simplistic and mistaken. The more proper 
cognitive model for the recognition and operation of genre 
involves the interplay between Schema Theory, Prototype Theory, 
and its cousin—the Exemplar Theory. 
Schema Theory postulates that all knowledge is organized into 
units or categories.136 Many scholars have observed that schemata 
“guide the production and comprehension of both content and 
forms of text.”137 “We make sense of our new experiences by 
placing them into categories . . . [and] these mental blueprints 
provide both shortcuts and stereotypes.”138 As sets of related 
elements, genre schemas “organize knowledge about related . . . 
                                                          
133 See generally MARK TURNER, READING MINDS: THE STUDY OF ENGLISH 
IN THE AGE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 150 (1991). 
134 Michael Sinding, “A Sermon in the Midst of a Smutty Tale:” Blending in 
Genres of Speech, Writing and Literature, in COGNITIVE LITERARY STUDIES: 
CURRENT THEMES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 145, 157 & n.1 (Isabel Jean & Julien 
Jacques Simon eds., 2012) [hereinafter Sinding, A Sermon in the Midst]; 
Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2 at 184–85, 214–15; Michael Sinding, 
Blending in a Baciyelmo: Don Quixote’s Genre Blending and the Invention of 
the Novel, in BLENDING AND THE STUDY OF NARRATIVE 147 (Ralf Schneider & 
Marcus Hartner eds., 2012); Michael Sinding, Framing Monsters: Multiple and 
Mixed Genres, Cognitive Category Theory, and Gravity’s Rainbow, 31 POETICS 
TODAY 465, 467 (2010) [hereinafter Sinding, Framing Monsters]. 
135 Sinding, Framing Monsters, supra note 134, at 474. 
136 See generally RUMELHART, supra note 48.   
137 Chen, supra note 44, at 27; see also GIBBONS, supra note 17, at 11; JEAN 
MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA 
THEORY (1984) (discussing how schemata inform one’s understanding of 
stories); SWALES, supra note 18, at 83–92. 
138 Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor & 
Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 280 (2011). 
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texts.”139 In this way, genre functions as a “sense of the whole by 
which we may understand all of the parts.”140 Professor Sinding 
expressly argues that “much is gained when we regard genres as 
schemas.”141 Specifically, he explains that genres are 
“constellations of features at multiple levels” and proposes a model 
for genres of all kinds.142 In order from highest level to lowest 
level, his “genre generic space” looks like this: 
 Sociocognitive Action Frame: occasion, 
communicative purpose, social action context 
(including other genres) 
 
 Rhetorical Situation Frame: setting, speaker, 
audience, medium 
 
 Discourse Structure Frame:  
1) Extraliterary: sequence of discourse 
elements and relations (moves and 
steps), including form, speech act type, 
style, etc. 
2) Literary (Fiction): narrative (fictional 
rhetorical situation, story world with 
settings, characters, actions), narration 
(order of narration, form, style, etc.)143 
Sinding explains that each “frame” is embedded in the higher 
order frame, although they are nevertheless distinct. In the 
sociocognitive frame, the action is performed to “achieve a 
purpose on an occasion, with a certain rhetorical situation,” and in 
the intermediary frame, the writer or speaker communicates to an 
audience “using a certain discourse structure.”144  Sinding’s above 
tripartite model offers an excellent means by which to look at legal 
genres as nested schemas. Like Russian dolls, the outermost 
generic frame (Sociocognitive Action) is “thinking like a lawyer,” 
                                                          
139 Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2, at 195 (citation omitted). 




143 Id. at 196–97.   
144 Id. at 197.   
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the type of law—patent, divorce, criminal, etc.—is the middle doll 
(Rhetorical Situation), and the most specific genre, being the actual 
documents, such as application, divorce decree, or jury waiver 
(Discourse Structure).   
Developed by Dr. Eleanor Rosch and other researchers in the 
early 1970s, Prototype Theory postulates that people categorize 
items and concepts based on an idealized, or average, idealized 
representation of that category.145 A good example is a dog.146  
When discussing dogs, people often think of collies or retrievers, 
because such pooches represent the ideal prototype as opposed to 
pugs or Pomeranians.147 The Exemplar Theory is a cousin to 
Prototype Theory because they both employ a model.148 While the 
prototype view says that “we learn a summary representation of the 
whole category and classify by comparing the new items to the 
prototype,” the “exemplar view explains says that people 
categorize by learning and using specific remembered 
examples”149 known as a “paragon.”150 Within genre theory, a 
paragon becomes the model for others to emulate.151 Babe Ruth, 
Willie Mays, and Sandy Koufax are examples of baseball 
paragons.152 A paragon of the trial lawyer might be Clarence 
                                                          
145 See BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 38–39; see also SWALES, 
supra note 18, at 51–52; Eleanor H. Rosch, Cognitive Representation of 
Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 192, 224–26 
(1975); Eleanor H. Rosch, Natural Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 328 
(1973). 
146 Sinding, Framing Monsters, supra note 134, at 480. 
147 See Carolyn B. Mervis & Eleanor E. Rosch, Categorization of Natural 
Objects, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 89 (1981). 
148 See generally DANIEL REISBERG, COGNITION: EXPLORING THE SCIENCE 
OF THE MIND (4th ed. 2009); Kirsten Abbot-Smith & Michael Tomasello, 
Exemplar-Learning and Schematization in a Usage-Based Account of Syntactic 
Acquisition, 23 LINGUISTIC REV. 275 (2006); Douglas Hintzman, “Schema 
Abstraction” in a Multiple-Trace Memory Model, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 328 
(1986). 
149 See Sinding, Framing Monsters, supra note 134, at 480. 
150 Id. at 493. 
151 Id.   
152 See id. (citing George Lakoff, Cognitive Models and Prototype Theory, 
in CONCEPT AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: ECOLOGICAL AND 
INTELLECTUAL FACTORS IN CATEGORIZATION 79 (Ulric Neisse ed., 1987)). 
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Darrow, and to a law student, a paragon contract might be the one 
he or she first studied in law school.  Form books, often based on 
documents validated in court opinions, are examples of paragon 
documents.   
This is not just all theory. Because scientists can now see and 
measure brain activity in response to defined stimuli, neural 
imaging and cognitive science have also uncovered the neural 
substrates and networks that play key roles in categories of both 
knowledge and prototype thinking.153 As Indiana University 
Associate Professor of Spanish & French World Languages Julien 
Simon concludes, “[G]enres are an integral part of cognition . . . 
[w]e naturally cluster the information picked up from our 
environment . . . .”154   
Finally, although by a different name, the existence of a genre 
bias has been directly explored by scholars.  For example, in 1999, 
researchers examined whether the labeling of certain lyrics without 
accompanying music as “rap,” “heavy metal,” “pop,” or “country” 
would influence a reader’s interpretation of lyrics as pro-social or 
antisocial.155 The lyrics labeled as “rap” or “heavy metal” led 
participants to conclude that those songs were less likely to inspire 
pro-social behavior than when those same lyrics were labeled 
“pop” or “country.”156 Similar studies outside the realm of music 
genre research reveal how a reader’s comprehension is 
influenced—or biased—by labeling a given text as one genre or 
another.  In one study, researchers established that calling a given 
                                                          
153 See generally Alexander G. Huth et al., A Continuous Semantic Space 
Describes the Representation of Thousands of Object and Action Categories 
Across the Human Brain, 76 NEURON 1210 (2012); Mark L. Johnson, Mind, 
Metaphor, Law, 59 MERCER L. REV. 845, 848–56 (2007); Paul J. Reber et al., 
Dissociating Explicit and Implicit Category Knowledge with fMRI, 15 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 574–83 (2006); Simon, Rational Choice, supra note 
71, at 107 (citing FRIEDMANN PULVERMULLER, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF 
LANGUAGE ON BRAIN CIRCUITS OF WORDS AND SERIAL ORDER (2002)). 
154 Julien Simon, A Neurocognitive Study of Literary Genres: The Case of 
the Novela Dialogada 9 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,  
Purdue University) [hereinafter Simon Ph.D. Thesis], available at 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/305265351. 
155 See Mary E. Ballard et al., Genre of Music and Lyrical Content: 
Expectation Effects, 160 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 476, 477 (1999). 
156 Id. at 482–84. 
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text either “a literary story” or “a news story” greatly impacted the 
reader’s comprehension.157 Specifically, subjects reading the text 
as “literature” experienced longer reading times, better memory of 
surface information, and poorer memory of situational information 
as compared to those who read the same text under a “news” 
label.158 Researchers suggest that “information about text genre 
triggers strategic processes in reading [and that] in most 
naturalistic situations, people read texts belonging to a particular 
genre, and they adhere (consciously or subconsciously) to the 
constraints of that genre.”159 
Indeed, new biases are “discovered” regularly. Following on 
Simon’s work, now is as good a time as any to discover genre 
bias—a cognitive bias hiding in plain sight. The published list160 of 
cognitive biases includes biases whose definitions overlap and 
others that work in unison or are part of suites of biases. However, 
genre bias has never before been recognized on a published list. It 
should be. Regardless of what it is called, ultimately genre bias 
helps create a reality by constraining writers’ choices and 
channeling readers’ expectations. French philosopher Jacques 
Derrida famously said that “[t]here is no genreless text.”161 And 
certainly, genre bias applies to every aspect of writing, including 
legal writing. Lawyers need to understand how genre shapes the 
perception of what they read and how it shapes the opinions and 
judgments derived from those readings.  
 
V.  GENRE BIAS IN LEGAL WRITING  
 
A. New Rhetoric – A Road to Genre Bias in Legal Studies 
  
To co-opt Derrida—there is no genreless legal text. This is true 
                                                          
157 Rolf A. Zwaan, Effect of Genre Expectations on Text Comprehension, 
20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 920 (1994). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 931. 
160 For a sample list of cognitive biases, see List of Cognitive Biases, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2013). 
161 Jacques Derrida, The Law of Genre, in MODERN GENRE THEORY 219, 
230 (David Duff ed., 2000). 
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for legal reading and writing.162  Consequently, honoring the genre 
in legal writing by remaining true to its strictures bestows a 
positive cognitive bias, while breaking the genre is 
disadvantageous. Either way, genre bias skews rational thought, a 
fact of which lawyers must be aware and must be wary. 
Stanchi points the way forward path, observing that 
“[a]dvocacy is most effective when the lawyer has the tools to 
make deliberate, conscious decisions about the persuasive device 
to employ and how . . . to employ it.”163 But traditionally, legal 
writing has been viewed as a “technical exercise in graphics”—the 
mere representation of thought in symbols.164 However, this is 
backwards. John Marshall Law School Professor Joel R. Cornwell 
explains that “writing is the interplay of images that we call 
thinking, a processing of data into symbols that compel other 
symbols.”165 He continues: “Thought presupposes imagery because 
there is otherwise nothing to think . . . so writing is thought in its 
purest form.”166 This does not mean that writing is “necessary” for 
thought, or that the human mind is a “blank slate” upon which 
culture writes views of truth through symbols.167 Rather, writing is 
the interplay between the body, the brain, and the outside world 
and is represented by symbols which help us interpret the world.168 
                                                          
162 Cf. Christine M. Venter, Analyze This: Using Taxonomies to “Scaffold” 
Students’ Legal Thinking and Writing Skills, 57 MERCER L. REV. 621, 632 
(2006) (“[R]eading is a way of constructing knowledge, and proficient readers 
actually make meaning by and through their interactions with the text. 
According to the New Rhetoric, what a reader understands and retains from the 
text and context depends upon the reader’s prior knowledge of similar texts and 
contexts”) (footnote omitted). 
163 Stanchi, supra note 78, at 413. 
164 Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. 
REV. 1091, 1094 (1997). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1094–95. 
167 See generally PINKER, supra note 103 (discussing the history of the 
view of the human mind as a blank slate and the modern view challenging that 
view). 
168 This holistic view of how we do this is called “embodied cognition” 
which “contends that cognitive processes develop when a tightly coupled system 
emerges from real-time, goal-directed interactions between organisms and their 
environment; the nature of these interactions influences the formation and 
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Writing, as a sign system, is a major component of the process of 
making meaning.169 
  The idea of writing as thought is an established one within 
the humanities.170 But only now is the important consequence of 
writing and thought as “making meaning” generating inroads into 
the legal writing world. It is doing so under the moniker “New 
Rhetoric.” As University of Nevada Law School Professor Linda 
L. Berger points out, “[i]n the New Rhetoric, writing is a process 
for creating knowledge, not merely a means for communicating 
it.”171  In New Rhetoric, genres are situated in the communities 
that give rise to them, where the specific genre is a “negotiable 
‘social fact’ rather than an invariable set of conventions.”172 A 
good example of this is the genre of college writing and how 
students are constrained by the fact that they write for instructors 
                                                          
further specifies the nature of the developing cognitive capacities.” Embodied 
Cognition, IEP, http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); 
see also Gerald M. Edelman, The Embodiment of the Mind, 135 DAEDALUS 23–
32 (2006); SLINGERLAND, supra note 119, at 9–14. 
169 For a discussion of “meaning making,” see supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. There is an interesting note when using the word “writing” 
in the context of embodied cognition. For example, the physical act of writing 
with pen and paper is more effective for learning then a computer. Specifically, 
writing sends feedback signals to the brain and leaves a “motor memory,” which 
later makes it easier to recall the information connected with the actually 
physical movement.  See Gulnaz Saiyed, Writing By Hand Better for Learning, 
Study Shows, MEDILL REPORTS CHI. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://news.medill. 
northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=177291. The study is also discussed in 
Anne-Mangen & Jean-Luc Velay, Digitizing Literacy: Reflections on the 
Haptics of Writing, in ADVANCES HAPTICS 385 (Mehrdad Hosseini Zadeh ed., 
2010). 
170 See CHARLES BAZERMAN ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE TO WRITING 
ACROSS THE CURRICULUM 57 (2005); Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better 
Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the “Casebook” Classroom 
(Without Grading Papers), 10 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 23, 25–
27 (2004); Robert J. Marzano, Art & Science of Teaching/Writing to Learn, 69 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 82 (2012). 
171 Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb 
and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text, and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156 
(1999) [hereinafter Berger, Applying New Rhetoric]; Venter, supra note 162, at 
632.   
172 Corbett, supra note 27, at 28. 
228 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
who are trained to read compositions in a certain way.173   
Within the New Rhetoric paradigm, some contend that this 
knowledge-shaping174 is primarily within the individual,175 while 
others contend this knowledge construction takes place within a 
social context.176 So-called inner-directed New Rhetoricians “seek 
to discover writing processes that are so fundamental as to be 
universal,” while so-called outer-directed New Rhetoricians 
believe thinking and language are each “a social construction.”177  
Both are correct. The idea of “making meaning” through writing is 
both cognitively and socially constructed,178 and this duality is 
evidenced in the concept of genre.179 Interestingly, while law 
reviews summarize the large body of non-legal scholarship that 
attests to genre’s influence in constraining writers and influencing 
readers and the resulting process of understanding the world,180 the 
legal writing academy lacks such genre scholarship of its own texts 
and ignores the importance of genre bias in legal writing 
altogether.181 One aim of this Article is to initiate such study so 
                                                          
173 See David Bartholomae, Inventing the University, in LITERACY: A 
CRITICAL SOURCEBOOK 403 (Ellen Cushman et al. eds., 2001). 
174 Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 157. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 158. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. (citing Linda Flower, Literate Action, in COMPOSITION IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CRISIS AND CHANGE 249 (Lynn Z. Bloom et al. eds., 
1996)). 
179 See Richard M. Coe & Aviva Freedman, Genre Theory: Australian and 
North American Approaches, in THEORIZING COMPOSITION, A CRITICAL 
SOURCEBOOK OF THEORY AND SCHOLARSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY COMPOSITION 
STUDIES 136, 136 (Mary Lynch Kennedy ed., 1998). 
180 See Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 157–58 
(discussing the knowledge shaping process); Linda L. Berger, Studying and 
Teaching “Law as Rhetoric:” A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING 1 (2010) 
(focusing on the rhetorical process as central to understanding and perception) 
[hereinafter Berger, Studying and Teaching]; Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, A 
Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the Legal Writing 
Classroom, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 319 (2011) (discussing rhetorical processes for 
understanding the world). 
181 Attesting to this point, in her article making the point that genre analysis 
is applicable to legal documents, Sneddon cites one authority, to wit: PETER 
GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY LAW 13 (1995) 
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that legal writers can be more effective writers.   
Persuasion, the essence of legal writing, is intimately 
intertwined with the nature of the specific audience. So is genre.182  
In certain professions, such as the law, this intersection of genre 
and persuasion is particularly important because “persuasion . . . 
finds its realization through various genres.”183 Genre study 
examines (1) the persuasive functions of the text, particularly 
formal features; (2) the practices surrounding the document; and 
(3) the language employed.184 Additionally, the study of genre 
considers the broader social action “performed by adhering to or 
resisting these formal features, analyzing the relationship between 
features and rhetorical action—the action that texts are employed 
to accomplish.”185 This idea of rhetorical action being employed to 
accomplish a goal is true in legal writing.   
Lawyers may have a passive and unarticulated appreciation of 
genre bias but this is not enough. Lawyers must understand that 
genre bias enhances comprehension and creates meaning, thereby 
simultaneously constraining choices for writers and forcing texts 
into a set mold which controls readers’ perceptions and reception 
of that text. Such is the yin and yang of genre. It needs to be 
central in the mind of the lawyer when she writes. As more 
specifically argued below, genre is a cognitive bias that matters to 
lawyers because (1) genre is a natural part of the human decision-
making process and law is about decision making; and (2) genre is 
                                                          
(asserting that law is a genre of rhetoric), and several other sources that examine 
the broader notion of rhetoric and law. Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, 
Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 674 
n.51 (2011) [hereinafter Sneddon, In the Name of God]. In arguing that law 
schools should embrace writing across the curriculum, Professor Parker brushes 
on the topic of genre in a section entitled “Writing Skills as ‘Tools of the 
Trade,’” but only in a footnote. Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the 
Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need it and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 
561, 580 n.73 (2004).   
182 PERSUASION ACROSS GENRES 11 (Helena Halmari & Tuija Virtanen 
eds., 2005). 
183 Id.  
184 See Miller, supra note 27. 
185 Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre:  
A Prospectus, 25 L. & LITERATURE. (forthcoming Fall 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298433; Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 2, at 301. 
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an essential ingredient in transactional documents and a vital part 
of every aspect of every brief, opinion, or other type of persuasive 
legal writing.186 However, before delving into the specifics of legal 
writing genres, it is important to explore how, in general, 
professions internalize and perpetuate genres.   
 
B. Professional Genres, Ceremonials, and Uptake: The Making 
of a Lawyer 
 
Semotician Tzvetan Todorov observed that “[i]n a [given] 
society, the recurrence of certain discursive properties is 
institutionalized, and individual texts are produced and perceived 
in relation to the norm constituted by this codification. A genre, 
whether literary or not, is nothing but this codification of 
discursive properties.”187 These discursive properties are the 
components of genre, and the normative process described by 
Todorov occurs in all professions. Such professional genres are 
like Russian Nesting Dolls188 with smaller sub-genres found within 
larger ones. This pattern is evident in all professional genres, from 
accountants to zoologists, and lawyers are no different.189 Lawyers 
create legal arguments and documents within “the parameters of 
accepted formats,”190 and so genre analysis should be (and is) 
implicit in legal writing textbooks.191 However, law school legal 
writing programs don’t engage in genre analysis192 even though 
                                                          
186 See infra Part V.C. 
187 Tzvetan Todorov & Richard M. Berong, The Origin of Genres, 8 NEW 
LITERARY HISTORY 159, 162 (1976). 
188 See Sindling, A Sermon in the Midst, supra note 134, at 146. 
189 GIBBONS, supra note 17, at 131; Coe & Freedman, supra note 179, at 
44. 
190 LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at xxxiii. 
191 Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181, at 674 (“Genre analysis 
is applicable to legal documents”).   
192 Cf. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 167 n.81 (citing 
Jessie C. Grearson, Teaching the Transitions, 4 LEGAL WRITING 57, 74–77 
(1998)) (advocating that legal writing teachers need to do more than just 
introduce students to the conventions of the legal writing community). It is a 
paradox that legal writing programs do not expressly teach genre, as genres, 
when the entire process of law school can be seen as one meta-genre, with the 
study of case law genre as the primary tool.  See also Mertz, supra note 16, at 
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genres are right there, hiding in the reeds.  
For example, Professor Robert N. Cook’s Legal Drafting, 
published in 1951, was the first textbook on legal writing, and 
offers 900 (now frail and yellowed) pages of specific forms of 
legal writing but never mentions the term “genre.”193 Cook does, 
however, offer a prescient note about the centrality of what this 
Article calls “genre bias.” Cook states in his Rule 23 that as “the 
whole is, in the art of legal composition, antecedent to the parts,” 
going on to explain that: 
This is a rule of importance in some other kinds of 
composition occasionally, but of special and 
invariable importance in legal composition.The 
draftsman should always and firmly grasp the whole 
law, deed, or pleading he is to draw, before he 
commences to draw any part. This may be done by 
skilled persons tacitly and almost unconsciously, as 
mental arithmetic by a skilled calculator.194 
In other words, genre bias operates in legal writing. 
A decade later, Professor Reed Dickerson provided a classic 
definition of legal writing that implied the importance of genre. He 
said that “[l]egal drafting is the crystallization and expression in 
definitive form of a legal right, privilege, function, duty [or] 
status. . . .”195 More recently, in a book for international students 
studying American law, Professor Jill J. Ramsfield notes that legal 
writing genres “function in specifically designed settings,” and she 
offers an entire chapter on various legal sub-genres.196 In a 
delightful book analogizing the law to architecture as a legal writer 
is both artist and engineer, Ramsfield sets out the “situational 
elements” of legal writing as including “traditions” which lawyers 
                                                          
82–83; Venter, supra note 162, at 629 (“Legal writing teachers want their 
students to master the conventions and genres of their discourse and to enter the 
legal community confident of their skills.”). 
193 See ROBERT NEVIN COOK, LEGAL DRAFTING (1951); see also Robert N. 
Cook, The Teaching of Legal Drafting, 4 W. RES. L. REV. 299 (1952). 
194 COOK, supra note 193, at 32.   
195 REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 3 (1965). 
196 JILL J. RAMSFIELD, CULTURE TO CULTURE: A GUIDE TO U.S. LEGAL 
WRITING 7–8 (2005).   
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are “expected to honor.”197 Zeroing in on genre bias, without using 
the term, Ramsfield declares that “[i]n each writing situation, you 
may be expected to exercise certain analytical choices derived 
from forms or patterns developed within the legal community. You 
learn these methods in law school, but your repertoire continues 
the increase afterward.”198   
In 2004, University of Wyoming College of Law Professor 
Michael R. Smith authored a comprehensive law review treatment 
of legal writing genres, addressing genre as taxonomy rather than 
from a rhetorical or socio-cognitive perspective.199 Smith identifies 
the categories of legal writing as (1) analysis writing, (2) legal 
drafting, and (3) critical analysis writing.200 Although Smith does 
not engage in genre analysis, his listing of these different genres of 
legal writing, and cataloging their application, is important to the 
study of genres as a cognitive bias in legal writing by cataloging 
their application. Without explicitly calling it genre bias, law 
professors Cook, Dickerson, Ramsfield and Smith each begin to 
point the path towards appreciation of the centrality of genre bias 
in legal writing.   
However, beyond the law school gate and across the 
metaphorical quad into the actual world lies a well-marked path of 
legal writing genre scholarship.201 According to one summary 
article, “[t]he legal genre, which has a well-established status in 
[Language for Specific Purposes] and sublanguage studies, 
includes a variety of texts and situational patterns.”202 Language 
for a specific purpose is simply language and culture study in 
                                                          
197 JILL J. RAMSFIELD, THE LAW AS ARCHITECTURE 7 (2000).  
198 Id. 
199 See Michael R. Smith, Alternative Substantive Approaches to Advanced 
Legal Writing Courses, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119 (2004). 
200 Id. at 122–28. 
201 See, e.g., GIROLAMO TESSUTO, INVESTIGATING ENGLISH LEGAL GENRES 
IN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL CONTEXTS (2012) (situating English legal 
language research in discourse and genre analytic framework by closely looking 
at the case note genre, the research article genre, and the book review academic 
genre).   
202 Conference Paper, Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Universidad de Zaragoza, 
The Relevance Theoretic Perspective on Legal Language (September 14–16, 
 2006), available at http://www.unizar.es/aelfe2006/ALEFE06/1.discourse/ 
26..pdf. 
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specific disciplines, such as medicine, business, law, or other 
areas.203 The summary article goes on to note that “[w]ithin the 
legal genre, there are ‘internal’ functional sub-genres, such as 
statutes, conventions, contracts with their numerous sub-
categories, wills, case reports, etc., which have received 
considerable attention both in theoretical and theoretical-
translation studies in the recent years.”204 For example, in 2003, 
Hong Kong Baptist University English Professor John Gibbons 
published a comprehensive analysis of legal language, including an 
extensive array of legal genres involved in the court system.205 He 
breaks down appearance genre, case report genre, police interview 
genre, guilty pleas genre, and several others, arguing that legal 
genres create a primary reality prescribing behavior and 
meaning.206 English Professor Vijay K. Bhatia at City University 
of Hong Kong has also been particularly interested in genres 
within the legal discourse.207 Bhatia defines genre as: 
[a] recognizable communicative event characterized 
by a set of communicative purpose(s) identified and 
mutually understood by the members of the 
professional or academic community in which it 
regularly occurs. Most often it is highly structured 
and conventionalized with constraints on allowable 
contributions in terms of their intent, positioning, 
form and functional value. These constraints, 
however, are often exploited by the expert members 
of the discourse community to achieve private 
intentions within the framework of socially 
                                                          
203 See Helen Basturkmen & Catherine Elder, The Practice of LSP, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS 672 (A. Davies & C. Elder eds., 2004) 
(“LSP is generally used to refer to the teaching and research of language in 
relation to the communicative needs of speakers of a second language in facing 
a particular workplace, academic, or professional context. In such contexts 
language is used for a limited range of communicative events.”). 
204 Witczak-Plisiecka, supra note 202, at 182. 
205 See GIBBONS, supra note 17. 
206 See id. at 130–31. 
207 See LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES AND SYSTEMS (Vijay K. 
Bhatia et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES]. 
234 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
recognized purpose(s).208  
This scholarship also points the path to understanding what a 
lawyer is at his or her core. Generations of lawyers have been 
taught to “think like a lawyer” and more recently, lawyers have 
been trained to “write like a lawyer.”209 This Article contends that 
to realize the former, a lawyer must master the latter.210   
Genres are forms of situated cognition, since how we think and 
how we act or write are related and operate as a feedback loop.  In 
fact, sociologist Anthony Giddens notes the existence of a 
“recursive phenomenon in which, through our social practices, we 
reproduce the very social structures that subsequently make our 
actions necessary, possible, recognizable, and meaningful, so that 
our practices reproduce the very structures that consequently call 
for these practices.”211 Legal forms, like any genre element such as 
Devitt’s grocery list,212 are no different.213 
Nested as systems within systems (previously described as 
similar to a set of Russian Nesting Dolls), genres not only interact 
in a recursive way in their professional with their constituent 
practices, but genres also relate and feedback into larger genre 
systems called ceremonials.214 Summarizing the work of Anne 
Freadman,215 English professors Anis S. Bawarshi and Mary Jo 
Reiff explain how genres are like “games” that take place within 
                                                          
208 BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE, supra note 17, at 13. 
209 See, e.g., John D. Feerick Writing Like a Lawyer, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 381 (1993); Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Improving Legal Writing: A Life-Long 
Learning Process and Continuing Professional Challenge, 21 TOURO L. REV. 
507 (2005). 
210 See Miller, supra note 27; see also Mark K. Osbeck, What is “Good 
Legal Writing” and Why Does it Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 417 (2012).   
211 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 80 (citing ANTHONY GIDDENS, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 
(1986)). 
212 See DEVITT, supra note 36, at 23–24. 
213 See Davis, supra note 38. 
214 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 84 (quoting Anne Freadman, 
Anyone for Tennis?, in GENRE AND THE NEW RHETORIC 43, 46 (Aviva Freedman 
& Peter Medway eds., 2003)). 
215 Id. (citing Freadman, supra note 214, at 43; Anne Freadman, Uptake, in 
THE RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY OF GENRE: STRATEGIES FOR STABILITY AND 
CHANGE 39 (Richard M. Coe et al. eds., 2002)).  
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these “ceremonials.”216 (Linda Berger calls ceremonials a 
“problem-solving performance.”)217 Within those ceremonials, 
“genres constitute the rules for play for the exchange of 
texts . . . .”218 Conveniently for lawyers, these non-lawyer genre 
scholars use the ceremonial of a trial to illustrate their point. A trial 
consists of several interrelated genres (jury selection, opening 
statement, direct, cross, closing, jury instructions, deliberation, and 
reading the verdict). Bawarshi and Reiff explain the operation of 
genre: 
Each of these moments is a genre, though it may be 
occupied by several texts, and each of the texts will 
deploy a range of tactics . . . . To understand the 
rules of the genre is to know when and where it is 
appropriate to do and say certain things, and to 
know that to do and say them at inappropriate 
places and times is to run the risk of having them 
ruled out. To use these rules with skill is to apply 
questions of strategy to decisions of timing and the 
tactical plan of the rhetoric.219 [W]ithin the rules of 
the ceremonial, the various genres play off of each 
other in coordinated, consequential ways. And 
within the rules of the genre game, every text is a 
situated performance in which its speaker or writer 
plays off of the typified strategies embodied in the 
genre, including the sense of timing and 
opportunity.220  
To play the game, you need to know the rules, and only an 
expert can meaningfully participate in this recursive 
phenomenon.221  The ability to know how to negotiate genres, how 
to apply genres, and how to turn genre strategies into textual 
practices involves something called uptake.222 Uptake is effectively 
                                                          
216 Id.  
217 Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 164. 
218 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 84. 
219 Id. at 85 (quoting Freadman, supra note 214, at 43). 
220 Id. 
221 See Abner & Kierstead, supra note 44, at 366–69 (summarizing the 
difference between novice and expert lawyer cognition). 
222 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 85 (citing Freadman, supra note 
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selection. As Freadman explains, uptake “selects, defines or 
represents its object . . . . This is the hidden dimension of the long, 
ramified, intertextual memory of uptake: the object is taken from a 
set of possibilities.”223 In other words, uptake is selection. “What 
we choose to take up and how we do so is the result of learned 
recognition of significance over time and in a particular context” 
that becomes habit.224 Again, think of the simple grocery list and 
how its use becomes habit. Cognitively, this “learned recognition 
of significance” is a manifestation of the schema and prototype 
theories discussed earlier.225 Broadly, it is the epitome of learning 
to think and write like a lawyer—it is the meta-genre of the 
profession.   
Lawyers, like all experts, habitually select among 
possibilities—the essence of uptake. Linda Berger discusses uptake 
by other terms226 citing cognitive research and noting that “[a]cross 
the board, experts show greater use of stored schemas [or, genres] 
and self-reflective techniques [or uptake], and they draw on a 
broader range of strategies appropriate to their domain.”227 Uptake 
or “self-reflective techniques” are processing professional 
cognitive chops. “Knowledge of uptake is knowledge of what to 
                                                          
214, at 43). 
223 Id. at 86 (citing Freadman, supra note 214, at 43). 
224 Id.; see also Ann M. Johns, Genre Awareness for the Novice Academic 
Student: An Ongoing Quest, 41 LANGUAGE TEACHING 237, 241 (2008) (“When 
we read or write in a genre with which we are familiar, and for which we have a 
schema, we instantiate our schema for what typifies that genre, its conventions, 
as we read or write, and we use our knowledge of conventions as we produce a 
new text. The conventions of a genre can refer to a variety of features: the text 
structure, the register, the relationships between the writer and the audience, the 
uses of non-linear material (e.g., graphs or charts), the common fonts, and even 
the paper type and quality.”). 
225 See supra Part IV. 
226 Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171. Professor Berger’s 
article pre-dates Freadman’s work on uptake and, therefore, the differing 
terminology is understandable. That said Berger’s discussion of New Rhetoric 
generally, and her discussion of expert-novice research in particular, fits four-
square into Freadman’s thesis. For that matter, Cook’s Rule 23 implies uptake as 
well. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
227 Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 164 (alteration in 
original). 
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take up, how, and when, including how to execute uptakes 
strategically and when to resist expected uptakes.”228   
Bawarshi and Reiff conclude that “such genre uptake 
knowledge is often tacitly acquired, ideologically consequential, 
deeply remembered and affective, and quite durable, connected not 
only to memories of prior, habitual responses to a genre, but also 
memories of prior engagements with other, related genres.”229 
Moreover, “genre uptake knowledge is also bound up in memories 
of prior experiences, relations with users of the genre, and a sense 
of one’s authority within a ceremonial”230—in other words, a 
strong cognitive bias.  Uptake is the key to legal writing because it 
is the process by which we learn to write like tax lawyers, or 
divorce lawyers, or patent lawyers and so forth.  Indeed uptake, as 
the cognitive doorway that leads to genre bias, is central to the 
making of an effective legal writer. 
 
C. Genre Bias in Transactional and Persuasive Legal Writing 
 
Stepping back to look broadly at legal writing genres, 
legislation has the “status of [a] primary legal genre,”231 the 
outermost nested Russian doll.  Legislation “forms the basis and 
essence of all legal conceptualizations and practices,”232  since the 
regulation of human affairs in a democracy is accomplished 
primarily through legislation. Legislative text is often characterized 
by precise, clear, and unambiguous expressions of certainty in 
legislative intent. To accomplish this goal, the legislative legal 
writing genre employs a “complex array of qualifications, often 
strategically positioned at syntactic points where they are unlikely 
to attract any ambiguous or unintended interpretation.”233 These 
aspects of legislative legal writing “form the basis of the 
underlying cognitive structuring”234 in the legislative sentence.  
                                                          
228 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 86. 
229 Id. 
230 Id.  
231 Bhatia, Legal Genres, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
232 Id. at 6. 
233 Id. at 2.   
234 Id. Other aspects of legislative genre that aid in accomplishing the 
purpose include nominalizing verbs. 
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 Cases, the next encased doll, represent a sub-genre in the 
system of legal genres because they are derived from legislation.  
Here, the “system” of legal genres divides into “enabling genres,” 
such as briefs and pleadings, and “target genres,” such as deeds 
and contracts or simply “litigation” and “transactional.” In his 
taxonomy, Smith describes them as “application analysis writing” 
and “legal drafting.”235 Within these legal spaces are the various 
specific sub-genres (or more dolls) where each such sub-genre 
represents “a typified communicative action invoked in response to 
a recurrent situation.”236  
A given genre (or sub-genre) that results from, and guides, a 
given recurrent situations is characterized by similar form and 
substance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology professors 
Joanne Yates and Wanda T. Orlikowski have devised a model for 
identification and analysis of genres in which they explain that 
“form refers to the observable physical and linguistic features of 
the communication[s],” such as text-formatting devices (i.e., 
agenda), “communication medium,” and “language or symbol 
system.237 Substance238 is the typified response and “refers to 
social motives, themes and topics being expressed in the 
communication.”239  
This concept applies nicely to legal writing. For example, 
within the realm of transactional documents, typified responses 
                                                          
235 Smith, supra note 199, at 122–25. 
236 Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 2, at 301 (emphasis added). The 
Recurrent situations include the history and nature of the established practices, 
social relations, and communication media within the organization.   
237 Id. at 302. 
238 Id. at 301–02. 
239 Id. at 301. Yates and Orlikowski apply this methodology to the memo 
genre of internal business correspondence. They examine the history from the 
scant use of such memos until the later part of the nineteenth century, when 
“manufacturing firms mushroomed,” leading to a need for written internal 
communications. Id. at 313. They examine the reasons for the memorandum 
over time and form elements including filing systems like vertical files. They 
turn to the introduction of email and how it both transformed the genre and was 
constrained by it.  Genre analysis, they explain, “does not attempt to understand 
the practice as an isolated act or outcome, but as communicative action that is 
situated in a stream of social practices which shape and are shaped by it.” Id. at 
318. 
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take the form of, well, forms. Lawyers call these typified responses 
to recurrent situations “boilerplate.” Judge Frank Easterbrook 
rightly concludes that “phrases become boilerplate when many 
parties find that the language serves their ends.” Boilerplate is 
ubiquitous in transactional documents. In their recent book on 
boilerplate language, Professors Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott 
focus on the theories that explain the “stickiness of boilerplate” 
and echoing Judge Easterbrook, contend that boilerplate sticks for 
a host of reasons including familiarity, use by a network, pressure 
to avoid novel forms, organizational routine, and what the authors 
call “endowment effects.”240 The endowment effect is a cognitive 
bias that favors the status quo.241 In other words, typified responses 
are such because they are treated as such.  
The existence and resilience of boilerplate supports the claim 
that genre bias exists and matters. Application of the Yates and 
Orlikowski’s Recurrent Situation Yields Genre Defined By Form/ 
Substance model to legal writing sub-genres reveals not only that 
these sub-genres are well-established, but also rounds out the thesis 
that genre bias matters and supports the conclusion that lawyers 
should not break genre. It is to that application, this Article now 
turns.   
 
1. Examples of Transactional Legal Writing Sub-Genre: Patent 
Application and Wills 
 
There are drafters and litigators—a dichotomy fostered in law 
school classrooms242 and lived out, coast to coast, in boardrooms, 
conference rooms, and courtrooms. Although much more of the 
practice of law takes place in boardrooms and conference rooms 
than in courtrooms,243 law school legal writing programs continue 
                                                          
240 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF 
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 
(2013). Endowment effects overlap with what is called here genre bias.   
241 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 36 (1988). 
242 Celeste M. Hammond, Integrating Doctrine and Skills in First-Year 
Courses: A Transactional Attorney’s Perspective, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
409, 409–13 (2011). 
243 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
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to treat transactional legal writing as the forgotten child.244 Not 
surprisingly, the same is true with regard to genre analysis of 
transactional legal discourses. Few published works discuss the 
genre of transactional documents. Indeed, existing scholarship 
merely reveals that transactional legal writing demonstrates a 
conservative, highly structured set of conventions with a high 
proportion of standard formulae favoring archaic expressions, 
complex patterns of syntax, specialized terminology, and endless 
repetition resistant to change. Transactional legal writing is also a 
sub-genre that punishes those who transgress its boundaries.245 
While some claim that demanding adherence to the genre is a way 
for those in control to monopolize knowledge, linguistic scholars 
rightly argue that “the overall purpose of this type of discourse is 
to promote clarity and certainty within the professional 
community.”246 Turning to two types of transactional document 
genres, patent applications, and wills we can explore how these 
highly structured, formal genres function in the real legal world. 
University of California at Santa Barbara Professor Charles 
Bazerman, a founder in the field of genre studies, did some of his 
pioneering work by analyzing the U.S. patent application.247  From 
his study, we can glean the general principles applicable to 
transactional legal genres. Looking at the history of patent 
applications, the forms, and the process of granting the application, 
Bazerman finds “a complex web of interrelated genres where each 
                                                          
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 
(2004).   
244 Hammond, supra note 242, at 409–14. 
245 Bridgitte Norlyk, Conflicts In Professional Discourse: Language, Law 
and Real Estate, in ANALYZING PROFESSIONAL GENRES 163, 168 (Anna 
Trosbord ed., 2000). Over the past 20 years or so the Plain Language Movement 
has tried to address the structured conventions of transactional legal writing by 
making legal language more accessible to non-lawyers. See Julie A. Baker, And 
the Winner Is: How Principles of Cognitive Science Resolve the Plain Language 
Debate, 80 UMKC L. REV. 287, 288–95 (2011) (concluding that plain language 
does not mean simple language, necessarily, and that an effective legal writer 
chooses language from across the spectrum “to achieve credibility and 
persuasive force”). 
246 Norlyk, supra note 245, at 168 (citing BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE, 
supra note 17). 
247 See, e.g., CHARLES BAZERMAN, CONSTRUCTING EXPERIENCE (1984). 
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participant makes a recognizable act or move in some recognizable 
genre, which then may be followed by a certain range of 
appropriate generic responses by others.”248 As Bawarshi and Reiff 
elaborate in their comprehensive book on genre: 
Bazerman suggests that a genre system includes 
genres from multiple genre sets, over time, and can 
involve the interaction of users with different levels 
of expertise and authority, who may not all have 
equal knowledge of or access to all the genres 
within the system. Yet, the relationship of the 
genres to one another, coordinated through a series 
of appropriately timed and expected uptakes, 
enables their users to enact complex social actions 
over time—in this case, enabling the approval or 
denial of a patent grant.249   
Echoing Bazerman’s conclusion, without citing him, 
practitioner Scott W. Cummings describes the genre of the patent 
application process, in a publication for the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association as “daunting.” The patent genre is  
myriad substantive and formal legal requirements because patent 
applications are “ideally written with an extremely diverse 
audience in mind: the inventor(s); the patent office examiner; IP 
counsel/tech transfer; investors; CEOs and other corporate officers; 
prospective licensee(s); potential infringer(s); and IP litigators 
(both hostile and friendly).”250 Cummings also lists nine distinct 
aspects of the patent genre.251 Without using the term “genre,” 
                                                          
248 Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and the Enactment of Social 
Intentions, in GENRE IN THE NEW RHETORIC 79, 96–97 (Aviva Freedman & 
Peter Medway eds., 1994). 
249 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 88.   
250 Scott W. Cummings, An Overview of Application Drafting and 
Provisional Applications, AIPLA (August 2009), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Test Document Library/2010/pppt/Cummings_Paper.pdf. 
251 Id. at 3. Those elements are: (1) describe the invention adequately so 
that one skilled in the art can understand and practice it; (2) disclose the best 
mode for carrying out the invention; (3) describe all features that may be 
necessary to support a claim that distinguishes the invention from the prior art; 
(4) claim the invention narrowly enough to avoid the prior art; (5) claim the 
invention broadly enough to prevent competitors from designing around the 
patent; (6) claim the invention clearly enough to put the public on notice as to 
242 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Cummings essentially describes the Patent Application genre and 
how it habituates uptake, which “inform[s] our expectations and 
intentions as we encounter, experience, and negotiate the seams 
between genres.”252   
Estate planning documents constitute another transaction 
document sub-genre.  In a pair of recent articles, Mercer University 
School of Law legal writing professor Karen J. Sneddon offers a 
comprehensive discussion of the importance of genre bias in estate 
planning documents and the issues raised by violating that 
genre.253  She notes that: 
Wills are a stable genre where the language must be 
substantively operative and accurate. One 
seemingly innocuous word change can alter the 
meaning of a bequest and can trigger a series of 
unintended consequences. This has led to the 
replication of the form and substance of wills for 
hundreds of years. And yet, while there are 
identifiable characteristics of the genre of wills, 
wills are not mere mechanized copies of documents 
drafted decades ago. Each will is unique. “For the 
writer-craftsman the genre serves as an external 
template, but the great artist awakens the semantic 
possibilities that lie within it.” Each document in a 
genre, including the genre of wills, involves “a great 
deal of individual choice, for not every aspect of 
every text is specified by any genre. Within any 
genre, there is a great deal of ‘free’ variation.” Each 
reviewed will acknowledges the expected form and 
                                                          
what the applicant considers to be their property; (7) contain only factually 
accurate statements in order to avoid charges of lack of enforceability due to 
inequitable conduct; (8) satisfy the requirements for patentability of various 
countries around the world; and (9) tell a good story. Id. 
252 BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 90. 
253 See Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181 (using rhetorical 
artifacts to detect the features, utility, and objectives of the genre of wills in 
estate planning); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills 
and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683 (2011) [hereinafter Sneddon, 
Speaking for the Dead] (examining the independent voice in wills, and the role 
and significance of accurate and operative wills). 
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substance of the genre. And yet, each will also 
acknowledges the needs of a particular individual 
testator.254 
Sneddon proceeds to identify the five preserved ritual 
characteristics that “form the core” of the will sub-genre: “(1) the 
lyrical title of ‘Last Will and Testament,’ (2) the invocation in the 
introduction, (3) the weighty gift, bequest, and devise of the rest, 
residue, and remainder; (4) the duty-laden nomination of executors 
and trustees; and (5) the resonating closing.”255 In this 
comprehensive treatment of a sub-genre, Sneddon demonstrates 
the socio-cognitive aspects of genre to which all lawyers need to 
be attuned. Sneddon’s article should be a model for application to 
and analysis of other sub-genres, be they transactional documents 
and litigation documents.  
  
2. Example of Litigation Sub-Genre: The Appellate Brief 
 
Lawyers litigate. They have, for centuries, in courthouses on 
every corner of the globe. The lineage and ubiquity of this 
recurrent rhetorical situation offers fertile ground for genre 
analysis, yet scholarship is scant. The most extensive genre 
analysis of the litigation sub-genre is a hard-to-find book entitled 
Legal Discourse Across Cultures and Systems.256 In the United 
States, Professor James Stratman delved into the effect of cognitive 
biases in connection with the specific litigation sub-genres.  In 
                                                          
254 Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181, at 686–87 (citation 
omitted). 
255 Id. at 694. 
256 See generally LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES, supra note 207. 
The book was unavailable at any library in Illinois, which includes extensive 
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substance of the sub-genre of international commercial arbitration. See generally 
id. 
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1994, for example, Stratman explored the appellate brief sub-
genre, seeking to understand the cognitive processes of both the 
writer (lawyer) and the reader (clerk and judge).257 Summarizing 
earlier studies by Benoit,258 Stratman concludes that appellate 
writers are more effective when their briefs provide the reader with 
what the reader expects.259 Stratman’s study affirms the primacy of 
genre in the persuasive process. Emphasizing cognitive-response 
theory260 and citing Professor William Benoit’s studies of 
argumentative strategies used before the Supreme Court,261 
Stratman notes the importance of the initial presentation of the 
argument to its ultimate success or failure.262 Brief-readers’ own 
memories (or schemata) influence their cognition, and the template 
that is the sub-genre of the appellate brief offers the surest, safest 
route to winning.  
It is easy to see why Stratman’s conclusions are true. As 
explained above, the Yates and Orlikowski’s  model looks first to 
the recurrent situation. With an appeal, the well-established 
practice in which the social relations between judge and attorney, 
and attorney and attorney, are highly proscribed. Within that 
community, communication is only through the written brief, 
                                                          
257 See James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal 
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal 
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Strategies Employed In Supreme Court Opinions, in DIMENSIONS OF 
ARGUMENT: PROCEEDING OF THE SECOND SUMMER CONFERENCE ON 
ARGUMENTATION (J. Rhodes  & S. Newell eds., 1981) [hereinafter Benoit, An 
Empirical Investigation]; William L Benoit,  Attorney Argumentation  and  
Supreme Court Opinions, 26 AUGMENTATION & ADVOCACY 22 (1989) 
[hereinafter Benoit, Attorney Argumentation]. 
259 See Stratman, supra note 257, at 15. 
260 Cognitive response theory emphasizes the causal role the argument 
receiver’s own thought processes may play in persuasion. See Anthony G. 
Greenwald, Cognitive Learning, Cognitive Response to Persuasion, and Attitude 
Change, in PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ATTITUDES 147, 149 (1968) 
(measuring the relationship between persuasion, learning, and retention).   
261 See Benoit, An Empirical Investigation, supra note 258, at 179; Benoit, 
Attorney Argumentation, supra note 258, at 22. 
262 Stratman, supra note 257, at 15. 
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followed by oral argument, then ending with a written opinion.263  
The form and substance of each step is highly structured, such that 
failure to follow the prescriptions can result in dismissal of the 
case entirely.264 The form of the appeal requires “observable 
physical and linguistic features of the communications,”265 which 
are set by court rules266 in many cases, and violation of those rules 
is grounds for rejection of the text entirely. Judge Richard Posner 
put it this way: “We are not sticklers, precisians, nitpickers, or 
sadists. But in an era of swollen appellate dockets, courts are 
entitled to insist on meticulous compliance with rules sensibly 
designed to make appellate briefs as valuable an aid to the 
decisional process as they can be.”267   
                                                          
263 See The Appeals Process, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsPro
cess.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
264 For example, in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1998), 
the Court held that the use of “et al.” in the notice of appeal was insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, even though it was obvious that the 
appellant intended to appeal the entire lower court decision. Id. at 317–18. In a 
strong defense of the importance of the rules, and implicitly following the 
established genre, Justice Scalia wrote in his concurrence: 
The principle that “mere technicalities” should not stand in the 
way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for 
ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to their 
construction and application. By definition all rules of 
procedure are technicalities; sanction for failure to comply 
with them always prevents the court from deciding where 
justice lies in the particular case, on the theory that securing a 
fair and orderly process enables more justice to be done in the 
totality of cases. 
Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
265 Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 2. 
266 For example, Rule 32 in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
specifies such matters as size limitations, the manner of reproduction, the 
binding, the cover, and the signature. FED. R. APP. P. 32. The requirements set 
forth in Rule 28(a) are mandatory, and noncompliance warrants dismissal of the 
appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a); see also Sioson v. Knights of Columbus, 303 F.3d 
458, 459–60 (2d Cir. 2002) (requirements set out in Rule 28(a) are mandatory); 
Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc., 164 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(declining to reach into merits of case because appeal’s main contention was 
frivolous). 
267 Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi. Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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The substance of the appeal is also constrained.  The motives 
of the actors are always the same: the appellant wants reversal, the 
appellee wants affirmation, and the court wants to get it right.  
Each of their respective communications is penned with this 
“given” in mind and read accordingly.  But is there a choice to do 
otherwise and be a maverick?  
  
3. Bucking the Bias by Breaking the Genre  
 
a. General Rule: Don’t Break the Genre 
 
Recommendation: in transactional documents, don’t ever break 
the genre. It is that simple. With regard to litigation documents like 
appellate briefs, the answer is a bit modified: don’t ever break the 
genre, unless there is a very compelling reason.  
Pause. Here is why. Breaking the genre comes with risk—risk 
because you as a writer are thwarting the expectations of your 
reader. Think of the mystery book that ends without resolution,268 
the fairytale in which the main characters do not live happily ever 
after,269 or the action film where the star is killed in the middle of 
the story, while walking out of a bathroom.270 Each exemplifies a 
case where the author broke the genre—bold, yes, but effective? 
Maybe not. The consequence of this authorial choice is usually 
reader frustration,271 or disappointment,272 or simply obscurity of 
                                                          
268 E.g., TANA FRENCH, IN THE WOODS (reprt. ed. 2008) (writing her debut 
book, French concludes a murder mystery investigation with the discovery of an 
item, the meaning of which is inconclusive to the reader). 
269 For example, The Juniper Tree by the Brothers Grimm offers a tale of 
murder, cannibalism, and decapitation. See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM K. 
GRIMM, THE JUNIPER TREE: AND OTHER TALES FROM GRIMM 316 (Lore Segal & 
Randall Jarrell trans., 1973). 
270 See PULP FICTION (Miramax Films 1994). 
271 Steve Fuller, an Amazon.com reviewer of In the Woods, wrote a review 
typical of other readers’ feelings. Fuller wrote: 
Spoiler: To me, it’s unforgivable to write a mystery novel in 
which the mystery isn’t resolved . . . . The unforgivable part is 
creating a secondary mystery (which, to me, became the 
primary mystery) that is left completely unresolved. I’ve never 
been so angry. I felt betrayed. Which is the sad part, because 
other than that monumental betrayal, I loved French’s writing 
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the work,273 although there are exceptions. Viewers of Pulp Fiction 
may have been left bewildered when, in the middle of the movie, 
Butch Coolidge shoots Vincent Vega, who is coming out of the 
bathroom, but the movie won an Academy Award.274 Similarly, 
while In the Woods’s non-resolution frustrates readers, critics 
nonetheless love it.275  
Therefore, the general rule is then: do not break the genre 
unless there is a powerful reason to do so, and you are uniquely 
positioned by the situation and your skill to effect the move 
successfully. This is because “genres function simultaneously as 
premises to arguments and as metaphors for thinking.”276 For 
example, consider that the “cross-examination” genre functions as 
“a cognitive instrument for doing the rhetorical and pragmatic 
work of text production and interpretation, work that results both 
in a greater understanding of the ‘cross-examination-ness’ of a 
particular legal text and the possibilities and constraints of the 
                                                          
style. 
Steve Fuller, Comment to In the Woods Customer Reviews, AMAZON (February 
7, 2012), http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A2VY8CO6V76Q3/ 
ref=cm_pdp_rev_title_1?ie=UTF8&sort_by=MostRecentReview#R2Q8KK23H
XFCO. 
272 Another reviewer of In the Woods wrote, “No, I don’t think every novel 
has to conclude with everything nicely tidied up, but when I turned the last page 
I was just left with a feeling of disappointment.” Avid Reader, Comment  
to In the Woods Customer Reviews, AMAZON (August 12, 2007), http://www. 
amazon.com/review/R33KVH8W2927C6/ref=cm_srch_res_rtr_alt_3.   
273 Juniper Tree has yet to be made into a Disney cartoon, and likely won’t 
be. See Stacy Conradt et al., 8 Fairy Tales and Their No-So-Happy  
Endings, MENTAL FLOSS (Dec. 14, 2007, 11:30 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/ 
article/17601/8-fairy-tales-and-their-not-so-happy-endings. 
274 Pulp Fiction won the 1995 Academy Award for Best Original 
Screenplay. Awards for Pulp Fiction, IMDB, http://www. 
imdb.com/title/tt0110912/awards?ref_=tt_awd (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
275 In the Woods won numerous awards for Best First Novel. See  
Barry Awards, DEADLY PLEASURES, http://www.deadlypleasures.com/ 
barry.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); History of Guests of Honor  
and Anthony Award Winners, BOUCHERCON WORLD MYSTERY CONVENTION, 
http://www.bouchercon.info/history.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); Macavity 
Awards, MYSTERY READERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.mysteryreaders.org/ 
macavity.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
276 Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 157. 
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cross-examination genre.”277 Genres are persuasively powerful 
because they paradoxically explain texts, but not fully.  Genres 
channel readers’ minds. Like metaphors, genres “lead us to 
perceive that similarity in the midst of and in spite of 
difference.”278 The effectiveness of genres lies, therefore, not so 
much in their cognitive “powers of classification but in their 
powers of clarification and generativity.”279 That is, genres are not 
just buckets into which we place different types of texts, but more 
important genres help us understand, and stimulate thought—and 
that is genre bias. 
There is an important distinction when considering the 
recommendation of whether to break the genre with respect to 
transactional documents as opposed to litigation documents.  
Pleadings, briefs and the like are generally temporary, single-
purpose, finite writings. Such documents either work for the 
intended audience in the moment, or they do not, and then the 
litigants and judges move on. In this way, the litigation legal 
writing sub-genre is akin to a pitch in a baseball game.  The pitcher 
attempts to persuade the batter to swing and miss, hit a ground ball, 
or take the pitch looking as the umpire yells “strike three.” The 
audience and the rhetorical situation are clearly defined.  Similarly, 
momentary in its essence, the litigation document’s purpose 
happens then fleets.   
By contrast, transactional documents are most often not 
grounded in a moment or circumstance and their ultimate 
application and user often unknown. The contract drafted today 
could be relied on by unknown buyers years hence, as could the 
lease or promissory note. Wills, and many other transactional 
documents, are ambulatory—they amble through time. In this way, 
the transactional legal writing genre is more akin to a baseball 
stadium than a pitch thrown in that stadium. Built in 1914, Wrigley 
Field has played host to the likes of Ernie Banks, Kerry Wood, 
Gale Sayers, Dick Butkus, Paul McCartney, and even Patrick 
Kane.280 The builders of this “Green Cathedral”281 could not have 
                                                          
277 Id.   
278 Id. at 157–58 (quoting ADENA ROSMARIN, THE POWER OF GENRE 46). 
279 Id. at 158. 
280 The Cubs, Bears, a former Beatle, and even Blackhawks have all played 
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foreseen all the uses for their project, and yet today, a century after 
it was built, Wrigley proves functional, even exceptional.  
Similarly, the drafters of transactional documents, wills, leases, 
and the like are creating texts for unknown readers of an unknown 
time, in an unknown place, and for use in a to-be-determined 
situation.   
The fleeting nature of persuasive documents and the enduring 
existence of transactional documents is a distinction that matters in 
deciding whether to break the genre. As demonstrated below, 
while there may be rare occasions where you can break the genre 
in a brief or other persuasive document, that circumstance never 
applies to transactional documents. The difference comes from the 
audience’s knowledge and the rhetorical situation in which the text 
is used. With litigation documents, the audience—the judge—is 
known to the advocate, and the exact contours of the use of the text 
are known as well. Breaking the genre comes at great cost, but it 
may be worth it. That calculation can be made because the 
variables are known.  
In contrast to the ephemeral nature of persuasive documents, in 
some cases, wills are being probated that were drafted decades ago 
by lawyers likely long dead. The works of legal writing, maybe 
from the hand of the long since dead, are now read and interpreted 
by judges and heirs not only unknown at the time of drafting, but 
who may not have even been born at the time the document was 
written.282 The high degree of uncertainty as to when transactional 
                                                          
at Wrigley Field, also known as the Friendly Confines. Also, soccer has seen its 
turn on the field, but this author is not a soccer fan so cannot cite to any player 
by name. 
281 For those who have experienced the Friendly Confines, there is no need 
to prove the point.  For those unfortunate who have not, see PHILIP LOWRY, 
GREEN CATHEDRALS: THE ULTIMATE CELEBRATION OF ALL MAJOR LEAGUE 
BALLPARKS 54–58 (2006). 
282 Under Illinois law, original wills must be filed in the county in which 
the decedent was residing on the day of death within thirty days of death. 755 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-1 (West 2010). A review of the January and 
February 2013 will filings in Lake County, Illinois Circuit Court by the author 
revealed ninety-seven wills filed in a range from the most recent  dated two 
weeks prior to the decedent’s death, to the joint and mutual will of Emmett and 
Carol Burdick who in 1970 executed a will in their home town of Beaver Dam, 
Wisconsin, a will that took effect forty-three years later. The average age of the 
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documents will “kick in” and who they will affect makes tinkering 
with the “rules of the game”—the genre — something to be left on 
lawyers’ scroll of things “never done.” Now that we have 
completed a general overview, let’s dive into the two specific 
arenas of the legal writing sub-genres.   
 
b. Breaking the Genre in Opinions, Briefs, or Other Pleadings 
 
“Genres can be seen as constituting a kind of tacit contract 
between authors and readers.”283 While breaking a contract is often 
wrong, it is not always unwise.284 So if genre is a contract, should a 
litigator break the genre in a brief or other pleading, or a judge 
break the genre in an opinion? Generally, the answer is no—but 
sometimes and rarely, the answer is maybe. Whether a lawyer 
should create that hurdle is a decision fraught with high risk, and 
yet pregnant with potential pay-off. The risk is outright rejection.  
The pay-off is standing out from the crowd and thereby grabbing 
the reader’s attention, to some point otherwise lost in the 
ordinariness of the genre true text.   
Breaking the genre can knock your entire argument off kilter.  
Famously, this happened in the landmark case Roe v. Wade,285 
when the male attorney for the State of Texas, commenting on his 
female opposing counsel, broke the oral argument genre by telling 
a joke. Jay Floyd opened his argument the following: 
MR. FLOYD: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the 
Court:. [sic] It’s an old joke, but when a man argues 
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going 
                                                          
filed wills was eleven years.   
283 Daniel Chandler, An Introduction to Genre Theory, http://www. 
aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/intgenre.html  (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
See also Sonia Livingstone, The Rise and Fall of Audience Research: An Old 
Story with a New Ending, in DEFINING MEDIA STUDIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE FIELD 247–54 (Mark R. Levy & Michael Gurevitch eds., 2004) 
(“[D]ifferent genres specify different ‘contracts’ to be negotiated  between the 
text and the reader . . . which set up expectations on each side for the form of 
communication . . ., its functions . . ., its epistemology . . ., and the 
communicative frame.”). 
284 For an interesting discussion of the morality of breaching contracts, see 
Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006). 
285 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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to have the last word.286 
“Painful silence” greeted the joke and Mr. Floyd “struggled to 
regain momentum throughout the argument, according to one 
observer.”287   
Mr. Floyd’s example of breaking the genre represents clearly 
what not to do.288 Rarely, however, breaking the genre can have a 
powerful positive effect in the right context. Exceptions also define 
the outer-boundaries of the rule. If you look to when the legal 
writing genre has been broken, two examples come to mind, and 
both, not so surprisingly, are dissenting opinions. The sub-genre of 
the judicial opinion is well-established.289 One example of 
breaking the judicial genre is Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent from 
the grant of certiorari in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap,290 which he 
began as follows:  
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, 
Narcotics Strike Force, was working the morning 
                                                          
286 Transcript of First Oral Argument at 15, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (No.70-18). 
287 Geoffrey Sant, 8 Horrible Courtroom Jokes and Their Ensuing Legal 
Calamities, SALON (July 26, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.salon.com/ 
2013/07/26/8_horrible_courtroom_jokes_and_their_ensuing_legal_calamity/.  
288 One commentator, Josiah Jenkins, even speculates that this misstep 
played a role in the case going against the state. Life of the Law: Episode 5, 
Tough Crowd (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/breaking-down-the-
law-episode-5-how-to-survive-an-irs-audit/ (“[T]he most amazing thing is not 
just how bad the joke was, but how bad it was for the setting.  Arguing in 1971, 
in the midst of a cultural revolution, Jay Floyd should have done everything he 
could to downplay abortion as women’s rights issue. Instead he highlighted 
gender roles and in all the wrong ways.  Roe v. Wade would actually be argued a 
second time, and that time Jay Floyd wouldn’t get to represent the state. Jane 
Roe’s lawyer had been too unfocused on the first argument, but she came ready 
on the second trip and found an argument that would persuade the court.  In 
essence, with his corn-pone humor, Jay Floyd ruined the state’s best opportunity 
for a knock-out blow.”). 
289 See GEORGE, supra note 18, at 331–58 (discussing judicial opinion 
genre); Hafner, supra note 16 (clarifying that the genre of judicial opinions is 
prevalent). See generally Tarja Salmi-Tolonen, Persuasion in Judicial 
Argumentation: The Opinions of the Advocates General at the European Court 
of Justice, in PERSUASION ACROSS GENRES (Helena Halmari & Tuija Virtanen 
eds., 2005). 
290 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood? 
Tough as a three dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five 
years on the beat, nine months with the Strike 
Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the 
neighborhood.  
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. 
Another approached. Quick exchange of words. 
Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each 
man then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the 
guy wasn’t buying bus tokens. He radioed a 
description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer. 
Sure enough: three bags of crack in the guy’s 
pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just another 
day at the office.291 
Sounding more like novelist Raymond Chandler,292 Roberts 
shattered the genre of what a Supreme Court opinion statement of 
facts should be. 
Another example comes from U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who penned a stinging 
dissent to a court opinion upholding the conviction of Juan 
Ramirez-Lopez for smuggling illegal immigrants.293 His dissent 
was structured as a conversation between the losing lawyer and the 
client, Mr. Ramirez-Lopez. The lawyer explained how the trial was 
fair, and the dissent, with a heaping dose of sarcastic dialogue, 
made clear the error of the majority. The U.S. Department of 
Justice dropped all charges and released the defendant, avoiding 
express acknowledgment of the push from Kozinski’s dissent.294  
This is a prime, and rare, example of where breaking genre is 
actually effective.  What credit goes to the logic of the dissent, and 
what credit goes to the fact that he broke the genre may never be 
known, but what is clear is that the dissent was very unusual; so 
                                                          
291 Id. 
292 See Mark Sherman, Chief Justice Channels His Inner Raymond 
Chandler, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/2008-10-14-3790306095_x.htm. 
293 United States v. Ramirez-Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th Cir.  2003), 
withdrawn, 327 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2003). 
294 See Henry Weinstein, Appeal Lost, Yet Freedom Won, L.A. TIMES 
(April 23, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/23/local/me-free23.  
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was the Justice Department’s response—some causation is certain.   
While judges like Roberts and Kozinksi may take license with 
opinion sub-genre, there are at least three strong reasons why 
lawyers should carefully weigh the high costs against any possible 
benefit before doing so. First, judges are busy.295 Dockets are 
packed. Putting before a judge a brief that confounds the genre also 
confounds the judge. As one commenter noted, brief readers 
expecting “specific information in specific places” would find it 
“frustrating to look throughout the brief to find” that 
information.296And frustrated readers are less persuadable 
readers.297  
For example, take the case of Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest 
River, Inc.298 involving the “motion to strike” portions of the 
opponent’s brief. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook denied the motion and, in doing so, 
powerfully endorsed the reason to stick with the established 
appellate genre proscriptions.  His frustration pervades the opinion.  
He wrote, “[o]ne can search the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in vain without finding any provision for a ‘motion to 
strike’ whole document, let alone to strike sentences out of 
briefs.”299 The lawyer, who took the risk, lost the gamble. Judge 
                                                          
295 Not just judges for that matter. Opposing lawyers, clients and co-
counsel read legal documents and they are busy, too. See RICHARD K. 
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, 
STRATEGY AND STYLE 52 (5th ed. 2005) (“[T]he legal reader is a busy person, 
must read quickly, and cannot afford to read twice.”). 
296  Legal Brief Genre Analysis, JASON D. MACLEOD, http://www. 
jasondmacleod.com/legal-articles-2/legal-genre-analysis/. 
297 Sean Flammer, Persuading Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Writing 
Style, Persuasion, and the Use of Plain English, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
183, 184 (2010); see also Baker, supra note 245, at 298 (“Research has shown 
that where people are unfamiliar with the truth of a statement, fluency is one 
factor that the mind considers.”). 
298 464 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2006). 
299 Id. at 726–27. Judge Easterbrook continued: 
[D]espite the fact that motions to strike portions of briefs are 
not authorized by the rules and are not only unnecessary (from 
the parties’ perspective) but also pointless (from the 
judiciary’s), they are filed all the time. I see about one such 
motion during each week that I act as motions judge. I have 
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Easterbrook subtracted from the movant’s reply brief the number 
of pages wasted on the “beyond the genre” motion to strike.300   
Second, offering a brief outside the genre can engender a dose 
of dread and even offend the reader. There is strong research 
showing that delivering a text within a genre provides the reader 
with both emotional and cognitive pleasure.301 This pleasure is 
derived in part from the reader knowing where the text is going 
and having those expectations fulfilled.302 Expectations unmet lead 
to frustration. Professor of communication and the director of the 
Annenberg Public Policy Center at University of Pennsylvania 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson explains it this way: 
When the rhetorical parameters established by the 
generic tradition are overstepped, reaction is 
provoked. One element in the implied contract 
between rhetoric and audience is a clause 
stipulating that that he fulfill rather than frustrate 
the expectations created for the audience by existing 
genre.303 
More recently, Henry Jenkins, Provost’s Professor of 
Communication, Journalism, and Cinematic Arts at University of 
California at Los Angeles, summarizing a thesis submitted by Alec 
Austin, reiterated that the violation of a genre is a violation of a 
                                                          
never granted such a motion (and never will); I don’t believe 
that any of my colleagues grants such motions; yet the flow 
continues. 
Id.  
300 Id. at 727. 
301 Chandler, supra note 284 (citing Stephen Neale, Questions of Genre, in 
APPROACHES TO MEDIA: A READER 460 (Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Chris Newbold 
eds., 1990)). 
302 Id. (citing NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY, 43 
(1996)); see also Ashley Rexford, A Meditation on the Effects of Genre, ULOOP 
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://ucdavis.uloop.com/news/view.php/64294/a-meditation-
on-the-effects-of-genre (“If the book we are reading violates these expectations, 
we feel violated as readers. Our trust has been betrayed, and we are left 
wondering why this book is labeled in such a way if it is not doing the job 
intended for it to do.”). 
303 Kathleen M. Hall Jamieson, Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical 
Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 162, 167 (1973) [hereinafter Jamieson, Generic 
Constraints]. 
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contract between writer and reader.304 Such a violation of genre 
generally leaves the reader with three choices in an attempt “to 
redress perceived contract violations:” first there is dissatisfaction, 
which manifests itself in lessened engagement; second, there is 
withdrawal, which is evidenced in the loss of the audience member 
as a viewer; or finally there is an audience boycott, which 
manifests itself in a reader actively trying to dissuade others from 
supporting or engaging with a text.305   
These three negative outcomes of breaking the genre are 
particularly true with lawyers who submit writings that violate the 
proper genre because lawyering, even more than the arts, is a 
profession that privileges standardization. As Gibbons points out, 
“it is not in the interest of lawyers to produce new wordings 
because it may expose them to challenge”306 and “[t]hat is the fear 
that freezes lawyers and their language. It is precise now. We are 
safe with it now. Leave us alone. Don’t change.  Here we stay till 
death or disbarment.”307 Lawyers pay heed; genre flouters foster 
frustration.   
All the research cited above counsels against breaking the 
genre. In the only published study of its kind, Stratman 
methodically studied how cognitive biases may develop in brief 
writers, how those biases may affect their generation and strategic 
assessment of persuasive techniques, and how the readers (law 
clerks and judges) may react in initial and subsequent readings of 
the brief.308 In that study, Stratman first found that the brief 
reading played a pivotal role in appellate court decision-making.  
Stratman cited two stages of the reading: the initial reading and 
then a reflective reading when the judge is writing the opinion.309  
                                                          
304 Henry Jenkins, Genre Theory and Implicit Contracts, CONFESSIONS OF 
AN ACA-FAN: THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF HENRY JENKINS (May 4, 2007),  
http://henryjenkins.org/2007/05/genre_theory_and_implicit_cont.html. 
305 Id.  
306 GIBBONS, supra note 17, at 23–24 (quoting MELLINKOFF, supra note 17, 
at 295).     
307 Id. at 24 (quoting MELLINKOFF, supra note 17, at 295). 
308 See James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal 
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal 
Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESS 1 (1994).   
309 Id. at 15, 49. 
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Without discussing genre per se, Stratman explored the vital role 
that the argument-receiver’s own thought processes play before, 
during, and after initial exposure to the argument.310 A brief-
reader’s cognition is highly influenced by what “the receiver is 
thinking when a message is first presented, and the amount and 
kind of thinking that the receiver may use to evaluate the message 
upon initial presentation, may be equally important as any 
rhetorical technique used in the message medium itself.”311 In 
other words, first impressions matter.  And while a certain level of 
surprise in a story—called a narrative rug pull—can be 
entertaining, it is not persuasive.312   
Even worse than merely frustrating your reader, breaking genre 
may even boomerang. By way of example, in an appeal brought by 
this author seeking to reverse a post-decree change of custody, the 
central issue was the importance of stability and the need for the 
children to stay in their longtime hometown. The conclusion in the 
reply brief was simply this:  
Family Courts frequently and rightly talk about 
the importance of stability for a child. Children talk 
about it too. A child’s home is his source of comfort 
and stability. In a collection of poems written by 
children entitled Home Sweet Home, Michael, age 
9, says it simply: 
My room is blue, it’s real cool, 
It keeps me safe at night. 
I never fight. 
I like my bike.   
I like to fly a kite.   
But most of all,  
I like my room. 
And now I say goodnight.  
                                                          
310 Id. at 18–42. 
311 Id. at 15 (citing R. Perloff & T. Brock, And Thinking Makes It So: 
Cognitive Responses to Persuasion, in PERSUASION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 74–76 (M. Roloff & G. Miller eds., 1980)). 
312 Vera Tobin, Cognitive Bias and the Poetics of Surprise, 18 LANGUAGE 
& LIT. 155, 157 (2009) (explaining that surprise in a story works because it 
plays on the reader’s “curse of knowledge”—a cognitive bias, that allows 
readers to over-generalize, and then be surprised by the narrative rug-pull). 
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Ottawa was T’s home. Ottawa was D. Jr.’s 
home. The children should have stayed in their 
home unless demonstrable detriment was alleged 
and proven. Here, the trial court expressly chose not 
to apply the detriment standard. And, still, the trial 
court ordered the children away from their home.  It 
should not have done that. A remand is called for.313 
The California Court of Appeals appeared offended.  In its 
conclusion denying the appeal, the court wrote: 
In arguing the court erred by not applying the 
detriment standard [appellant] relies on secondary 
sources, and even poetry, on the importance of 
stability in children’s living arrangements . . . . It 
remains, however, that in addressing [appellant’s] 
argument the court was required to follow 
established legal precedent. We find no error . . . .314 
To be sure, a brief can be written in narrative form because a 
story is an accepted in the genre.  But verse may go too far afield 
for some judges. As Santa Clara University School of Law 
professor Stephen Smith notes, “[w]hen poetic form appears in 
obvious ways in a piece of legal writing, it is without question a 
curiosity and, perhaps, an object of ridicule.  A brief should rarely, 
if ever, be a poem.”315 And at least in one California Court of 
Appeals, a brief should rarely, if ever, recite one either.  
The third, and most important, reason not to break the genre is 
that doing so lessens the cognitive, and therefore, persuasive 
effects of genre bias. As discussed above, genre bias can be used to 
your advantage. Genre is a cognitive “spoon full of sugar” that 
makes it easier to swallow the weighty argument. That is, genre 
bias is a palliative device that makes a difficult reading a little less 
unpleasant, and an already pleasant reading even more so. Why 
would you, as a writer, ever forsake that advantage? 
If a litigator breaks the proscribed genre he or she should likely 
                                                          
313 Appellant’s Reply Brief at *8–9, Geiger v. Geiger, No. DO61114, 2012 
WL 6178289 (Cal. App. 4th Feb. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3117094. 
314 Geiger v. Geiger, No. DO61114, 2012 WL 6178289, at *6 (Cal. App. 
4th Feb. 12, 2012). 
315 Stephen E. Smith, The Poetry of Persuasion: Early Literary Theory and 
Its Advice to Legal Writers, 6 J. ALWD 55, 55 (2009). 
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be prepared for the judge to wince and react with a level of 
frustration, anger, and repulse. Thus the decision of a legal writer 
to take this bold step should only be employed in circumstances 
where the following factors are present. First, the likelihood of 
winning the motion or case by staying within the genre is remote. 
Second, it is essential to get the judge’s attention and stand out as  
not being a run-of-the-mill case. Finally, determine if the judge is 
going to be even remotely receptive to breaking the genre. Is this 
judge a stickler for rules, or is she receptive to presentation that is 
“outside the box?” For example, given Judge Easterbrook’s 
general hostility to texts that vary from the rules, filing a brief with 
poetry before that court would prove foolish. By contrast, and 
perhaps most famously, at the turn of the twentieth century, then-
attorney Louis Brandeis filed a brief in Muller v. Oregon316 that 
broke the genre by relying on social science (110 pages of the 
brief) rather than legal precedent (two pages of the brief) to 
support his client’s position.317 Although his success in breaking 
the genre to create a new sub-genre that has become a “staple”318 
of Supreme Court practice, it establishes that there are ever-so-rare 
circumstances where breaking genre can be effective. Few of us, 
however, write like Louis Brandeis—very few.    
 
c. Breaking the Genre in Transactional Documents 
 
Never, ever, ever break the genre with a transactional 
document. As explained above, these documents are ambulatory 
and their ultimate application and users unknown. However, as 
Kristin Davis notes, not breaking the genre is different from blind 
adherence to a generic form.319 In the only article to address the 
                                                          
316 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
317 Brief for the Appellant, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 
107), 1908 WL 27605; see also THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
318 Id. at 101. 
319 Davis, supra note 38, at 709 (citing Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Sawers, 903 
N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ohio 2009) (holding that it was misconduct for a lawyer to use 
a generic trust document for a client and make no effort to adapt that document 
to the client’s needs)).  
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question directly,320 Sneddon urges lawyers to reject the strict 
strictures of the wills sub-genre by using language that 
personalizes the document and incorporates the testator’s 
subjective “voice.”321 She raises some genre-analysis-related 
questions. What are the implications of an attorney drafting a will 
with conscious disregard to the established genre?322 How will a 
will imbued with the subjectiveness of the testator’s voice be 
received by the intended audience—heirs and judges?323 Sneddon 
speculatively provides some answers, and her analysis is 
intriguing.   
Ultimately, however, infusing a will with the testator’s 
subjective voice is a risk better left untaken. As a practicing estate 
plan attorney, the author and his estate planning colleagues are 
always mindful that using established language and forms is 
nowhere more necessary than in estate planning. This sub-genre 
relies on an established entrenched understanding among attorneys 
and conveys the testator’s present intent to the future decedent’s 
audience—heirs and judges. The strong bias created by the 
entrenched sub-genre of wills counsels lawyers to religiously 
adhere to the genre. Sneddon’s entreaty to tinker with that genre 
should be met with trepidation. The “understanding” that comes 
from reliance on the established sub-genre can have real-world 
consequences.   
Recently in Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Rosen, in the context of 
litigation over the meaning of an estate plan, the Illinois Appellate 
Court spoke about the importance of adhering to genre, holding 
that the use of technical language governed.324 At issue was the 
term “taxable estate,” and the difference in interpretation of that 
could cost one side or the other millions of dollars.325 The court 
noted that “[t]echnical terms with established meanings are 
presumed to be used according to their technical meanings” and 
lawyers who write documents are presumed to write within the 
                                                          
320 Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead, supra note 253.  
321 Id. at 696. 
322 Id. at 709–21. 
323 Id. 
324  957 N.E.2d 956, 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
325 Id. 
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genre.326 The application of that view controlled the outcome of 
the case.327 In the estate planning context more broadly, Gerry W. 
Beyer, cited by Sneddon, says as much: 
[W]ills contain standardized provisions, [so] the 
user may safely rely that the language of each form 
will be the same every time the form is used . . . . 
This uniformity allows the user to confidently 
predict the results that will flow from the use of the 
form. Past personal experience with the form, 
legislation, and judicial decisions assist the user in 
anticipating whether the will form will function as 
intended.328 
Genre matters because it establishes the conventions upon 
which language is interpreted. What if the subjective voice of 
testator in Rosen were used in place of technical language?  How 
would a court have been guided and constrained—or left to float 
untethered—because the scrivener wanted the testator or his family 
to be comforted by the will’s words? It is better for the client to put 
what will be remembered as his or her emotional final thoughts in 
a letter or a video329 than it is to tinker with a well-established legal 
writing sub-genre. The purpose of the former is to salve grief, 
while the latter is meant to be an executory document relating to 
the transfer or property and wealth. Different purposes yield 
different genres. This is not to criticize Sneddon but to commend 
her. Her comprehensive analysis paves the way for understanding 
why genre analysis should be done and how legal sub-genres 
should be questioned. While suggesting breaking genres in an 
academic paper is acceptable; rejecting them in practice is simply 
A Bridge Too Far.   
 
  
                                                          
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181, at 691 (citing Gerry W. 
Beyer, Statutory Will Methodologies—Incorporated Forums vs. Fill-In Forms: 
Rivalry or Peaceful Coexistence?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 231, 289 (1990)). 
329 See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution 
Ceremony—Preventing Frustration of the Testator’s Final Wishes, 15 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 1 (1983). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
David Mellinkoff, in his classic book on legal language, 
affirmed the obvious that “the law is a profession of words.”330  
While true, the law is also a profession of genres. Lawyers are the 
quintessential persuaders, and legal writing is their tool of the 
trade.331 To be its most effective, that tool must generally fit within 
the genre that the reader’s mind will most readily accept and 
process. A reader readily accepting and processing text is the 
function, and the consequence, of genre.332 Genre stimulates, 
channels and accelerates cognition;333 in other words, genre bias.  
Without those cognitive processes engaged by the legal texts, the 
next steps—acceptance (for transactional documents) and 
persuasion (for litigation documents)—become just that much 
higher.  
This Article offers only the start of a discussion about genre 
bias and legal writing. Other issues need to be explored, including 
how genres originate and change—for surely they do. As professor 
Jamieson wrote forty years ago, “[b]y speaking of the effects of 
generic classification as generic constraints, this essay may have 
inadvertently suggested that generic classification is the boulder of 
Sisyphus to rhetors and critics. Such need not be the case. Genres 
should not be viewed as static forms but as evolving 
phenomena.”334   
But, if as this Article suggests, practitioners should not break 
the genre, then who initiates the change? In part, change comes 
from academia, and from the rule-makers, courts, and legislatures.  
Unlike lawyers, these participants in the legal writing genre do not 
answer to a client, and therefore, they are freer to stray. The plain 
language movement of the 1970s and 1980s is a good example of 
                                                          
330 MELLINKOFF, supra note 17, at vi. 
331 This is becoming an increasing reality as oral arguments are becoming 
less commonplace. See Flammer, supra note 297, at 280. 
332 See Jamieson, supra note 303, at 163 (“Genres are shaped in response to 
a rhetor’s perception of the expectations of the audience and the demands of the 
situation.”) 
333 See supra notes 125–32 and accompanying text. 
334 Jamieson, supra note 303, at 168. 
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how genre changes335—so too are modifications of rules of 
procedure.336 Indeed, some argue that boilerplate can only change 
when the system is “shocked” by a change in the marketplace.337  
Sometimes it is a great lawyer, like Louis Brandeis, who reshapes 
the generic landscape.   
The consequence of these changes, their causes, and their 
effectiveness are all issues that subsequent scholarship should 
address. Here, my only purpose is to have the reader appreciate 
that genre bias is a legal writer’s hidden persuader. Nothing more.  
That genre, especially when used correctly, can gently channel the 
reader toward the writer’s way of thinking. Genre is a cognitive 
bias and should be treated as such.   
In their book, Persuasion Across Genres, professors Helena 
Halmari and Tuila Virtanen liken the cognitive process of what this 
Article calls genre bias to the Aesop fable of The North Wind and 
the Sun.338 It is apt, and I will use it too: 
The North Wind and the Sun had a quarrel 
about which of them was the stronger. While they 
were disputing with much heat and bluster, a 
Traveler passed along the road wrapped in a cloak. 
“Let us agree,” said the Sun, “that he is the 
                                                          
335 See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE 7–15 
(1991); LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF VICTORIA, PLAIN ENGLISH AND THE LAW 
45–52 (repr. 1990); Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game is Over, 
13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 519, 559–67 (1985); Joseph Kimble, Plain 
English: A Charter for Clear Writing, 9 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 19–22 (1992).  
336 The publication of cases online in the public domain, for example, has 
led the Illinois Supreme Court to change how cases are cited in briefs. The 
alteration of the extant genre requires briefs to now cite to the paragraph of a 
case (which court must include in their published opinions), as opposed to the 
page number.  Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 6 (“For Illinois cases filed on or after July 1, 2011, 
and for any case not published in the Illinois Official Reports prior to that date 
and for which a public-domain citation has been assigned, the public-domain 
citation shall be given and, where appropriate, pinpoint citations to paragraph 
numbers shall be given; a citation to the North Eastern Reporter and/or the 
Illinois Decisions may be added but is not required.”). 
337 See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
338 PERSUASION ACROSS GENRES, supra note 11, at 243. Although the 
authors do not expressly call it “genre bias” but rather explain how “genres 
persuade via implicit means,” there is an implicit cognitive process bias. 
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stronger who can strip that Traveler of his cloak.” 
“Very well,” growled the North Wind, and at 
once sent a cold, howling blast against the Traveler. 
With the first gust of wind the ends of the cloak 
whipped about the Traveler’s body. But he 
immediately wrapped it closely around him, and the 
harder the Wind blew, the tighter he held it to him. 
The North Wind tore angrily at the cloak, but all his 
efforts were in vain. 
Then the Sun began to shine. At first his beams 
were gentle, and in the pleasant warmth after the 
bitter cold of the North Wind, the Traveler 
unfastened his cloak and let it hang loosely from his 
shoulders. The Sun’s rays grew warmer and 
warmer. The man took off his cap and mopped his 
brow. At last he became so heated that he pulled off 
his cloak, and, to escape the blazing sunshine, threw 
himself down in the welcome shade of a tree by the 
roadside.339 
If you ignore the gentle force of the applicable legal sub-genre 
in the construction of a text, or try to force your way around it, like 
the North Wind, you will likely leave the reader’s mind wrapped 
closely to pre-existing beliefs, and your efforts at securing 
acceptance and effecting persuasion may well be in vane. 
 
                                                          
339 The North Wind and the Sun, in AESOP’S FABLES FOR CHILDREN 141 
(1919). 
